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Abstract 
 
In this thesis we propose a sketch towards an outwardly understanding of the nature of 
consciousness. We begin by arguing that all thought involves phenomenal character, then establish 
that all phenomenal character involves phenomenal concepts, which allows us to conclude that all 
thought involves phenomenal concepts. Finally, we survey the philosophical theoretical space to 
ground our thesis within established theories of consciousness, perception, and epistemology.   
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1 
Introduction 
 
In the start of their book Philosophy in the Flesh, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson identified 
three main findings of cognitive science which they claim stand in opposition to most classical 
philosophical traditions. These are: “The mind is inherently embodied. Thought is mostly 
unconscious. Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical”1. They proceed to explain that our 
understanding of reason has a bearing on our understanding of what it is to be human. They cite 
Cartesian mind/body duality, Kantian transcendentalism, and phenomenology as some of the 
traditions which dictated and skewed our conception of the nature of rationality, cognition, and 
consciousness, mainly due to their speculative nature rather than their dependence on empirical 
data.  
 This thesis follows on the footsteps of Lakoff and Johnson and many philosophers of mind, 
especially on the analytic side, who take the empirical side of philosophy to heart. The first claim 
is that the nature of consciousness itself does not allow for what we would refer to as completely 
subjective thinking, or inward thinking, that is thinking which is completely isolated from the 
world. We rather argue that since the nature of consciousness itself is outwardly, which means that 
it is constantly seeking stimuli, then thinking is also outwardly in nature. That is to say, not only 
do stimuli necessarily feature into our thinking, but they make it possible in the first place.  
In the first and second chapter, we argue two propositions:  
1. All thinking involves phenomenal character 
2. All phenomenal character involves phenomenal concepts 
which allow us to syllogistically conclude that: 
∴  All thinking involves phenomenal concepts  
 
1 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh. (New York: Basic books, 1999), 25, E-Book. 
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To put it simply, since thinking always involves phenomenal character which is the direct product 
of coming in contact with stimuli, and since this phenomenal character is always accompanied by 
phenomenal concepts, then thinking necessarily involves phenomenal concepts.2 
 The thesis adopts a neurophilosophical theoretical framework, where we take it that the 
findings of neuroscience, along with related disciplines to the empirical study of mind such as 
cognitive psychology, are pivotal to our understanding of the nature of our consciousness. In the 
third chapter, we survey the philosophical theoretical space in order to ground our thesis within 
established doctrines of theories of consciousness, perception, and epistemology.  
 What we need to make clear is that we do not believe that Lakoff and Johnson’s criticism 
of speculative philosophy is strictly directed towards the philosophers they named, but rather 
towards their contemporary following who still operate within these parameters which empirical 
research has put to the test. If we take Descartes for example, we will find that he was operating 
within the parameters of the most technological advancements of his time. As Michael O’Shea 
explains, 
“[i]n one important respect Descartes was breaking new ground. By comparing the 
workings of the brain with that of complex hydraulic machines, he was regarding the most 
technologically advanced artefacts of his day as templates for understanding the brain. This 
is a tradition that persists today; when we refer to computers and computational operations 
as models of how the brain acquires, processes, and stores information, for example. So 
while Descartes was hopelessly wrong in detail, he was adopting a modern style of 
reasoning”3. 
This is evident in Descartes break with the traditional Scholastic understanding of perceptual 
cognition. The Scholastics believed that  
 
2 Think of phenomenal character as the fuel that allows for there to be thought at all. While the content of a thought 
might not be that phenomenal character, if, say, the thought is about mathematics or about another thought, it is still 
only possible to have that thought because of the availability of some phenomenal character. Thus, phenomenal 
character is necessary for the process of thought but not necessarily to feature as its content. 
3 Michael O’Shea, The Brain: A Very Short Introduction. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 16.  
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perceptual cognition would take place in animals in the imagination, because they lack an 
intellect, so the imagination is the highest faculty they possess; whereas, in the case of 
human beings, it is in the higher faculty of the intellect that perceptual cognition (like 
intellectual cognition) takes place.4 
Descartes, on the other hand, believed in a direct link between the intellect and information from 
sense organs through the imagination (located in the penial gland). Thus, the difference between 
him and the Scholastics was that “whereas the imagination in the mindless animal has only one 
input, a sensory one, that in the human being has a sensory and an intellectual input”5. This direct 
link allowed Descartes to then reject the modularity of the human mind, arguing for the unity of 
the soul, giving that chief among his metaphysical commitments was that a fragmented soul is 
incapable of having free will6. 
 This brief account is not in defense of Descartes, but to showcase that the progress of 
philosophical inquiry has long depended on new advancements in our understanding of how the 
mind works. It thus seems odd that, in an age of such fundamental breakthroughs in our conception 
of the mind, thanks to advancements in neuroscience, cognitive science, biological psychology, 
etc., that these ideas did not correct, and automatically disqualify, certain classical philosophical 
conceptions which we held in such high regard only in virtue of having no way of decisively 
discrediting them. As the world moves more and more towards a better understanding of 
consciousness based on empirical findings, we find it imperative to follow suit and present a thesis 
which tracks and present some of the modern key discoveries regarding the nature of cognition 
and thought. In the same spirit of adopting the most technological advancement in philosophical 
inquiry, we begin our investigation into the nature of consciousness. 
 
 
4 Stephen Gaukroger. Descartes' System of Natural Philosophy. (Cambridge University Press: 2002), 220 
5 Gaukroger, Descartes', 220 
6 Gaukroger, Descartes', 223 
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Chapter I: On Sensory Restriction 
 
Section I: An Introduction to Sensory Restriction 
 
1. Descartes, Empirically Speaking  
In our introduction, we briefly touched upon Descartes conception of perceptual cognition. To 
explicate more, Descartes maintained that it involves three things 
The first is the corporeal world, the second the pure intellect, which contains abstractions, 
and the third the imagination, which is a corporeal organ which Descartes will later identify 
with the pineal gland. 7 […] The intellect understands ‘five-ness’ as something separate 
from five objects (or line segments, or points, or whatever), and hence the imagination is 
required if this ‘fiveness’ is to correspond to something in the world.8 […] The imagination 
represents to itself the contents of the world and it represents to itself the contents of the 
intellect, and perceptual cognition takes place when it maps these on to one another.9 
What we want to do in this chapter is to take an empirical look at this claim. What we essentially 
argue is that there cannot be any thought without some kind of perceptual cognition resulting in 
phenomenal character10. That is to say, that there cannot be a notion of ‘fiveness’ without the mind 
receiving stimulation which allows it to cognize of the notion. Keep in mind this does not say that 
the stimulus must be the number 5, but rather that there needs to be any type of stimulation for 
consciousness to operate as we know it. What this idea essentially disqualifies is notions such as 
Avicenna’s Floating Man argument, which postulates the possibility of the suspension of sensory 
experience to argue for the persistence of the soul independent of the body, or that for a mental 
state to be conscious there needs to be a higher order thought, as Rosenthal argues. What we are 
 
7 Stephen Gaukroger. Descartes' System of Natural Philosophy. (Cambridge University Press: 2002), 218. 
8 Gaukroger, Descartes', 219 
9 Gaukroger, Descartes', 220 
10 The phenomenal character is what it is like for one to undergo a certain experience. Given the debate around what 
that term means, we want to explain that we use it to mean any subjective experience under the threshold of an 
explicitly propositional thought at time t, including sensations, representations, etc. More on that will come in our 
discussion of A/P consciousness in chapter 2. This is different from quale-consciousness as the recognition or 
identification of a specific what-it-is-like which would involve an explicitly propositional thought. 
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rather arguing that without stimulation from the world, consciousness becomes in danger. This 
means that consciousness is not only a tool to receive stimulation, but also a tool to seek it. The 
implication of that includes that an idea such as inward thinking, i.e. thinking which is completely 
isolated from worldly stimulation, would not be possible since all thinking involves the residual 
phenomenal character which is the result of the brain coming in contact with a stimulus. Thus, we 
argue that all thinking involves phenomenal character.  
Since the claims regarding the nature of cognition are empirical in nature, we will take a 
look at it from an empirical standpoint. The way to do that is to look at what exactly happens if we 
deprive the brain from stimulation. In modern psychology, this can be induced in two ways: 
sensory and perceptual deprivation. Sensory deprivation, or SD, is defined as “an experimental 
environment designed to provide absolute reduction of intensity of input”11 such as “conditions of 
darkness or silence”12, while Perceptual deprivation, or PD, is “an experimental environment 
designed to provide solely homogeneous and unpatterned input” 13  such as “conditions of 
homogenous visual stimulation”14. In both cases, the subject’s exposure to worldly stimuli is 
interrupted in order to test his/her reaction to such interruption. However, before we look at sensory 
restriction, let us take a moment to ponder upon the connotations the word stimulus has. 
2. On Stimuli 
The Latin stimulus denoted a “pointed stick to goad animals”, and the verb stimulare “was used 
metaphorically for ‘something that incites or causes a response’”15. The Latin stimulāre initially 
 
11 A. Michael Rossi, “General Methodological Considerations,” in Sensory Deprivation: Fifteen Years of Research, 
ed. John P. Zubek (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 18. 
12 Marvin Zuckerman, "Variables Affecting Deprivation Results,” in Sensory Deprivation: Fifteen Years of Research, 
ed. John P. Zubek (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 50. 
13 Rossi, "General Methodological Considerations,” 19. 
14 Zuckerman, “Variables,” 50. 
15  Lemma stimulate, in: Word Origins, John Ayto, A&C Black, 2nd ed., 2006. Credo Reference, 
https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/acbwordorig/stimulate/0?institutionId=6166. Accessed 29 March 
2019. 
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meant “to urge forward (an animal) with a goad or a sim” and “to incite to action, spur on, urge, 
instigate”16. It evolved in English to become stimulate which means “to prick, sting, afflict”17, and 
in German stimuli means Ansporn, Anregung 18  and variants of the verb stimulate include 
anregen19, anstacheln and anspornen [to spur on]20. What, upon closer reflection, turns out to be 
problematic, is that in all cases, the word denotes a stationary recipient. Especially the verb 
anspornen which means ‘to urge on’, is suggesting a more or less idle and inactive party which is 
not anticipating a provocation. 
We seek to challenge this connotation in this thesis. We take stimulus to denote any 
disturbance in the environment which falls within the spectrum of frequencies the conscious mind 
would be capable of receiving and categorizing, however, with an anticipatory attitude from the 
receiver end. Instead of changing the word, we continue to use it to reflect the role that the 
environment plays in the process of perception, and to maintain a naturalistic flavor in our 
discussion. However, the semantic adage here, adding anticipation to stimulation, will prove 
important in the lines to come. With that out of the way, let us then take a deeper look at both types 
of sensory isolation. 
3. The Issue with Sensory Restriction  
Consider the following account of nurse Winnifred Kelm from a 1961 experiment described by 
Mical Raz as “one of the few detailed first-hand descriptions of sensory deprivation experiments”21. 
Raz reported that Kelm spent 8.5 days in a dark isolated room where she was instructed to move 
 
16 P. Glare, Oxford Latin Dictionary (2nd ed.), (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
17 J. A. Simpson & E. S. C. Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989). http://www.oed.com.libproxy.aucegypt.edu:2048/view/Entry/190374. Accessed 13 April 2019 
18 M. Clark & Thyen, O, Concise Oxford-Duden German Dictionary, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 586. 
19 Clark, Concise Oxford-Duden, 586 
20 Clark, Concise Oxford-Duden, 748 
21 Mical Raz. "Alone again: John Zubek and the troubled history of sensory deprivation research." Journal of the 
History of the Behavioral Sciences 49, no. 4 (Fall 2013): 379, https://doi.org/10.1002/jhbs.21631 
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as little as possible and had no contact with any of the examiners. She was not to brush her teeth 
and was even discouraged from thinking too much. She wore rubber earmuffs which both restricted 
her movement on the bed, preventing her from tossing and turning, and isolated her from any noise. 
Within a few days, Kelm had entered a state of complete hallucination where, in her mind, 
her husband, a psychology graduate student, had been in an accident. She rushed to the 
hospital, only to find her husband’s lifeless body being wheeled away. The experimenter’s 
report, who observed her throughout her isolation, indicated that she had cried constantly 
one entire afternoon and throughout most of the night. When she emerged from the 
experiment, after eight and a half days, she was confused, disoriented, and irritable.22 
However, not all the literature on sensory restriction has had such wild reports. Vernon & Hoffman 
(1956), from the research program at Princeton University, were first to report that “SD might have 
beneficial effects on intellectual performance”23. A group of psychologists in Richmond, between 
1958 and 1963, have conducted studies to improve “the self-image of psychiatric patients who 
underwent sensory deprivation and heard appropriate messages”24. How, then, can two completely 
different outcomes occur under the same conditions? To answer that, we need to take a look back 
at the history. 
 
Section II: A Sketch of the History of Sensory Restriction Experiments25 
 
We will begin by drawing a distinction between what we take to be the three main phases of 
sensory deprivation research: The McGill University phase, John Zubek’s phase, and the modern 
phase. Each phase has its own characteristics and its own objectives. The McGill University 
 
22 Raz, “Alone again,” 379.  
23 Austin Jones, "Stimulus-Seeking Behavior,” in Sensory Deprivation: Fifteen Years of Research, ed. John P. Zubek 
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 139. 
24 Peter Suedfeld, "Introduction and Historical Background," in Sensory Deprivation: Fifteen Years of Research, ed. 
John P. Zubek (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 12. 
25 Our review here is by no means exhaustive. However, it serves to illuminate some of the main reasons for the 
discrepancy of reported data between different SD and PD experiments throughout the years. 
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experiments are considered to have initiated the interest in sensory restriction research. In 1951, a 
group of psychologists led by D. O. Hebb, developed the experimental sensory deprivation 
technique. The primary drive for this was “an interest in Russian and Chinese brainwashing”26 
which was later confirmed by Hebb himself in a symposium held at Harvard Medical School27. 
The military side of the research objectives here was palpable in contrast to the line of research 
adopted by Zubek. Raz concretized the distinction when he maintained that “[w]hile in the setting 
of coercive interrogation, sensory deprivation was used to cause discomfort and anxiety, Zubek’s 
research, they argued, involved ‘lying in a dark, quiet room’.”28. Zubek himself stated that part of 
his objective was to “solve problems such as life in isolated areas in the sparsely populated areas 
in Canada’s north”29.  
The difference between the two lines of research was reflected in the results from the two 
phases. While the experience from Zubek’s experiment was “often ‘pleasant and relaxing’ and had 
been proven effective as a means to help people stop smoking” 30 , the McGill university 
experiments witnessed more dramatic results. In a PD experiment, Bexton, Heron, and Scott 
(1954) reported that “14 subjects were asked about their experiences. All of the subjects reported 
some visual sensations. Half of the subjects reported B-type31 sensations; e.g. ‘a row of little men, 
a German helmet.’ Three subjects reported animated, integrated scenes of a cartoonlike 
character”32 . In another PD experiment, Woodburn Heron (1961) reported that 25/29 of the 
 
26 Suedfeld, "Introduction and Historical Background,” 9 
27  D. O. Hebb, “Introduction,” in Sensory Deprivation: A Symposium Held at Harvard Medical School, ed. P. 
Solomon et al. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 6. 
28 Raz, “Alone again,” 390. 
29 No author. (1972). Brainwashing “not the object of research”. Winnipeg Free Press, March 9, quoted in Raz, “Alone 
again,” 389.  
30 Raz, “Alone again,” 390. 
31  A-Type Hallucinations are simple in nature (flashes of light, shapes, etc.), while B-Type are more complex 
(integrated or animated sensation/perceptions) – Zuckerman, “Hallucinations,” 94. 
32 Marvin Zuckerman, “Hallucinations, Reported sensations, and Images,” in Sensory Deprivation: Fifteen Years of 
Research, ed. John P. Zubek (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 95. 
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subjects reported “some form of hallucinatory activity”, as well as a general lack of control over 
the hallucinations and an inability to start or end them33. In this experiment,  
[the images] were often quite vivid and could not be terminated at will. Only three of the 
subjects believed that the phenomena were "real" and produced by outside sources. There 
was considerable movement in the RVSs34. The onset of the sensations varied from 20 
minutes to about 70 hours. Some subjects did not report them until they became very 
compelling, and four subjects did not report them until the experiment was completed.35  
 
In Heron et al. (1956), the 3 experimenters put themselves under perceptual deprivation for 6 days. 
They experienced what can be described as an escalating effect of PD. After one day, they reported  
simple visual disturbances such as dots and patterns to more complex experiences (i.e. 
scenery and people). After 6 days of isolation, they found they experienced a variety of 
visual disturbances including apparent movement of objects in the visual field, apparent 
movement associated with head/eye movements, distortions of shape, accentuation of after 
images and effects on the perception of colour and contrast.36 
Now let us consider some of the findings of the Zubek phase. In 1964, he published a paper titled 
“Behavioral Changes After Prolonged Perceptual Deprivation (No Intrusions)”. In it, he concluded, 
after running a perceptual isolation experiment for a week, that “increasing the severity of 
perceptual deprivation above that of our earlier experiments did not affect the incidence of 
hallucinations and post-isolation distortions of the perceptual environment. Both phenomena were 
rare”37. The stark contradiction between this and the findings from the McGill experiments and 
Heron et al. (1956) might throw the reader off, until Zubek maintains, one page later, that “[t]his 
discrepancy in results may be due to two procedural differences. First, our Ss wore no gauntlet-
 
33  Woodburn Heron, “Cognitive and Physiological Effects of Perceptual isolation,” in Sensory Deprivation: A 
Symposium Held at Harvard Medical School, ed. P. Solomon et al. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 16-17. 
34 RVS is short for Reported Visual Sensations and RAS is short for Reported Auditory sensations. This is different 
from RAS which is short for Reticular activating system which will be discussed later on. 
35 Zuckerman, “Hallucinations,” 96 
36  Donna M Lloyd et al., "A qualitative analysis of sensory phenomena induced by perceptual 
deprivation," Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11, no. 1 (2012): 97. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-011-
9233-z 
37 John P Zubek, "Behavioral changes after prolonged perceptual deprivation (no intrusions)." Perceptual and Motor 
Skills 18, no. 2 (1964): 413. 
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type gloves and hence received more tactile stimulation than did the McGill Ss. Second, our 
procedure involved occasional intrusions with visual test material in which the translucent goggles 
were briefly removed”38. One here must ask the reason why the title had “no intrusions”, while a 
page later the experimenter admits to clear intrusions which would facilitate the subjects with 
sufficient sensory stimulation. In earlier experiments, Zubek and others were also able to report 
that “[v]isual sensations of the simple A variety were more frequent in the SD condition while the 
more complex, type B RVS's were rare or absent in both conditions”39. Before we comment on the 
clear contradiction between Zubek’s and The McGill Uni’s findings, let us take a look at the 
modern phase. 
In 2011, Lloyd et al. conducted a perceptual deprivation experiment on 31 undergraduate 
psychology students who were required to listen to white noise for 30 minutes while wearing 
goggles. The subjects relayed their experiences into a Dictaphone as they experienced them, which 
eliminated any delay in reporting. They reported that “[c]omplex auditory experiences were the 
most commonly reported perceptions” 40 . Their analysis, which contains a good deal of 
phenomenological description, revealed two key characteristics of the hallucinations: their spatial 
character (being out-there in the world instead of in the subject’s mind), and “the perceiver’s role 
as an active contributor to the experience”41. They explicitly stated that “the increase in spatial 
information allowed the participant to communicate more ‘meaning’ in the reported sensation and 
was therefore more similar to ‘Type B’ phenomena” 42 . This is in contrast to the subjects’ 
perceptions of simple sensory variations which lacked meaning given the subjects attempt to relay 
 
38 Zubek, "Behavioral changes,” 414. [emphasis added] 
39 Zuckerman, “Variables,” 51. 
40 Lloyd et al., "A qualitative analysis,” 100. 
41 Lloyd et al., "A qualitative analysis,” 101. 
42 Lloyd et al., "A qualitative analysis,” 102. 
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their experience without attaching them to something external43. This allows us to make the 
tentative assumption that meaning requires the externality of the stimuli.  
In a 2004 visual deprivation experiment, Merabet et. al. reported that 10 out of 13 subjects, 
who had been blindfolded for 5 days, reported both simple and complex hallucinations, resulting 
in a conclusion that “rapid and complete visual deprivation is sufficient to induce visual 
hallucinations in normal subjects”44. This is in contrast to Zubek’s conclusion earlier that type B 
hallucination were rare in both PD and SD. Another very important distinction from the Zubek 
experiment is that the subjects in Merabet et. al. reported no hallucinatory experiences “during 
periods of tactile stimulation such as Braille reading instruction or during fMRI sessions”45. This 
might clarify the reason why Zubek found hallucinations to be rare in his experiments given the 
sensory input which his subjects received periodically.  
On the wider spectrum of inducing psychotic-like experiences (PLEs) 46  in normal 
population under sensory deprivation, Daniel et al. (2014) stated that “[i]n the modern era, several 
studies have attempted to use a sensory deprivation paradigm to induce PLEs in the normal 
population. Using more modern techniques, all studies were successful in inducing hallucinations 
of varying complexity in many of the participants”47. And in 2015, Daniel and Mason developed 
a model to predict PLEs during sensory deprivation. In both experiments, the conclusion indicated 
that sensory deprivation can be standardized as a low-risk non-pharmacological successful method 
 
43 Lloyd et al., "A qualitative analysis,” 102. 
44 Lotfi B. Merabet et al., "Visual hallucinations during prolonged blindfolding in sighted subjects," Journal of Neuro-
Ophthalmology 24, no. 2 (2004): 109. 
45 Merabet et al., "Visual hallucinations,” 110. 
46 Psychotic experiences “generally refers to subthreshold forms of hallucinations and delusions”; although this 
definition is not standardized. – Yung, Alison R., and Ashleigh Lin. "Psychotic experiences and their 
significance." World Psychiatry 15, no. 2 (2016): 130. 
47  Christina Daniel et al., "Psychotic-like experiences and their cognitive appraisal under short-term sensory 
deprivation," Frontiers in psychiatry 5 (2014): 2. 
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of inducing PLEs 48 , 49 . This, again, is in contradiction to Zubek’s remarks on the rarity of 
hallucinations.  
A pattern starts to emerge: The results from the modern phase have been consistently in 
line with those from the McGill University phase, and both stand in contrast to Zubek’s phase. 
This is due to the different motivations behind the three phases. The McGill University phase’s 
concern with brainwashing lead to more strict conditions of sensory restriction which resembled 
the conditions of the modern phase, while Zubek’s concern with the practical utilization of sensory 
restriction has led to looser conditions. This is not to argue that Zubek’s research was not 
important; of course, it is. However, this is to argue that standardizing Zubek’s results as a way to 
contradict the McGill University results and thus play down the effects of sensory restriction50, 
which has seemed as a shared sentiment among the authors in his edited book, Sensory 
Deprivation: Fifteen Years of Research, was a mistaken judgment. Let us now identify what 
exactly are we looking for in the three phases. 
 
Section III: High and Low Ends of Sensory Restriction 
 
Finding commonalities between the three phases is an impossible task given the vastness of the 
literature. However, what we can determine are the high and low ends of the spectrum of effects 
attributed to sensory restriction and see how they affect consciousness. If we are able to prove that, 
in both the low and high points on the spectrum of sensory restriction effects, inward thinking is 
not possible, then all the spectrum in between these two points will abide by their character. Think 
 
48 Daniel et al., “Psychotic-like experiences,” 7. 
49 Christina Daniel, and Oliver J. Mason. "Predicting psychotic-like experiences during sensory deprivation." BioMed 
research international 2015 (2015): 8. 
50 The difference in motivation lead to a difference in the experiments set up, which in turn lead to a drastic difference 
in results. Understandably, the historical context of the Zubek’s phase is critical to the understanding of the deeper 
motivations of framing and adjusting the work to that particular end. For an in-depth look into this historical context, 
please refer to Raz (2013). 
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of the features of the two ends as the necessary features of a larger set, then every subset would 
have to include these necessary features in order to belong to this larger set. All that would remain 
is formulate our understanding of the nature of consciousness in light of the current data. With that 
out of the way, let us look at what we take to be the low and high ends of effects under sensory 
restriction51, i.e. veridical somatic sensation and hallucinations. 
1. The Low End 
Under SD, subjects experience an increase in somesthetic sensation. It is believed that this is due 
to the fact that somesthetic sensation is the least restricted modality and thus it occupies more of 
the subject’s field of attention in the absence of stimulation52. Under SD conditions, stress and 
other associated isolation effects have been linked to the subjects’ recumbent position rather than 
a reduction in “the over-all level of sensory stimulation”53. Nonetheless, multiple results did 
support the hypothesis that “SD increases sensitivity to somesthetic stimuli because of a lack of 
competition from exteroceptive stimuli”, making it easier for somesthetic stimulation to occupy a 
larger portion of the subjects’ attention54.  
This continuous somesthetic stimulation, i.e. bodily discomfort, can be credited with 
stimulating the mind enough to constitute responding to a bodily presence which prevents the 
environment from being completely sensory restrictive. Lloyd et al. also agrees that “[p]erceptual 
deprivation is easier to control experimentally and does not produce the unwanted effects of social 
isolation or physical discomfort that sensory deprivation often can”55 . Furthermore, in tests 
performed after the fact, SD alone affected recollection and recognition, without affecting speech 
 
51 The low end represents the least intense activity recorded under sensory restriction, and the high end represents the 
most intense. 
52 Zuckerman, “Variables,” 53. 
53 Zuckerman, “Variables,” 54. 
54 Zuckerman, “Theoretical,” 420. 
55 Lloyd et al., "A qualitative analysis,” 96. 
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or abstract thinking, while PD alone was linked to reduction in “numerical facility, verbal fluency, 
and abstract reasoning”56; which led to the conclusion that “PD seems to produce a more extensive 
cognitive and perceptual impairment than SD”57. 
Nonetheless, bodily stimulation under PD conditions has actually proved to be beneficial 
for subjects. In a 1963 experiment, Zubek found that “physical exercises during PD resulted in 
significantly less impairment in intellectual and perceptual motor tests, and less EEG change than 
in PD subjects, not required to exercise during the one-week period”58. Granted, however, that 
two-third of the subjects who underwent exercise quit before the end of the week, just like the non-
exercise SD and PD groups, which indicates that the threshold for tolerance is crossed, despite the 
fact that exercise seemed to alleviate the effects of PD. Another positive effect of stimulation, this 
time under SD, is that, after a 3-day session, “[t]he post SD results tend to indicate that the SD 
subjects were benefiting from the learning during SD even though it was not reflected in their 
performance during SD”59.  
This indicates that the intervention of physical stimulation in sensory restriction can help 
the subject perform better in learning related activities. And if physical stimulation can provides 
the subject with sufficient stimulation to maintain a coherent level of thinking, then that lends 
support to the idea that bodily discomfort under SD has its own set of introduced effects which 
prevent the experience from being completely isolated;  meaning that, there can be no completely 
sensory restricted experiment since, even in cases of strict SD, subjects tend to use their body as a 
 
56 Zuckerman, “Variables,” 51. 
57 Zuckerman, “Variables,” 51. 
58 Zuckerman, “Variables,” 55. 
59 Zuckerman, “Variables,” 65. 
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means for self-stimulation. As Zuckerman puts it, “confinement to a bed in a small cubicle for 8 
hours produces generalized stress relative to a normal environment”60.  
We can here determine that inward thinking, in the low end of sensory restriction, does not 
occur since thinking under these circumstances is accompanied by sensations of bodily discomfort 
which produce a constant source of stimulation61 , which are accompanied with phenomenal 
character. 
2. The High End 
The high end which we identify here is hallucination. In Heron (1961), hallucinations were 
reported to have lasted for up to 70 hours. Additionally, “[a] number of studies have demonstrated 
that the reported visual sensations show a progression toward increasingly more complex and 
meaningful ones. The subjects first report diffuse blobs; then geometrical forms; then patterns; 
then objects; and, finally, integrated, animated scenes”62. Similarly, in Lloyd et al., “[t]hematic 
analysis of the data revealed there was a progression of spatiality in the phenomena reported during 
perceptual deprivation from noticing simple abstract variations in the stimulus array to fully 
immersive perceptions of complex multisensory events in the environment”63. Hallucinations are 
taken up as the high end of sensory restriction since they constitute consciousness’ attempt at 
positing a world when the subject’s connection with the world is disturbed. To understand this 
more, we need to take a deeper look into hallucinations. 
 
 
 
 
60 Zuckerman, “Variables,” 58. 
61 Sensation refers to the subjective experience, and Stimulation refers to the relation with the outside stimulus.  
62 Zuckerman, “Theoretical,” 420.  
63 Lloyd et al., "A qualitative analysis,” 106. 
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Section IV: The Neuroscience of Hallucinations 
 
1. On the Nature of Hallucination 
We will begin this section not with the philosophical debate, but with the neurological data at hand. 
In his discussion of visual hallucinations in patients with Charles Bonnet syndrome (CBS)64, 
Dominic H. Ffytche differentiates between mind’s eye, as the inner world, and eye’s mind 
(henceforth referred to as physical eye, to eliminate confusion), referring to the world around us. 
He maintains that specializations of brain regions resulted in the two taking place at different 
spatial points in the brain. While mind’s eye corresponded to activity in the “frontal, parietal and 
medial temporal cortex”, the physical eye corresponded to activity in “specialized visual cortical 
regions”65 . Interestingly, during hallucination, “[a]ctivity changes invariably occurred within 
[physical eye], not mind’s eye, regions, the content of a hallucination relating to the specialization 
of the eye’s mind region activated”66,67. This was also supported by Santhouse et al. (2000). They 
were able to determine, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), that “visual 
hallucinations [in CBS population] were related to phasic increases in activity within specialized 
visual cortex and that the location of the increases defined the type of experience reported”68. This 
 
64 CBS is a case of vision deterioration which leads to subjects experiencing hallucinations. Ffytche describes CBS 
hallucinations as being “silent, appear externally in the world, and are not under volitional control” – ffytche, “The 
Hallucinating Brain,” 50. 
65  Dominic H. ffytche, "The Hallucinating Brain: Neurobiological Insights into the Nature of 
Hallucinations,” in Hallucination: Philosophy and psychology, ed. Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013), 54 
66 Ffytche, “The Hallucinating Brain,” 54 
67 Ffytche maintains that this has not been proven in other modalities mainly due to “our limited understanding of the 
cortical organization of higher auditory, tactile, olfactory, and gustatory function.” He maintains, however, that “it 
seems likely that the same principle will apply, as hallucinations in these modalities are linked to cortical activation 
within their respective sensory system” – ffytche, “The Hallucinating Brain,” 54. Further evidence to support this 
hypothesis is that, by reviewing the data from Lloyd et al. and Merabet et al, we find that when the first restricted both 
vision and hearing, subjects reported both visual and auditory hallucinations, but when the second only restricted 
vision, subjects reported no auditory or somatosensory sensations. This indicates that perhaps hallucinations occur 
only in the restricted modality and does not leak to other modalities by association; which would also indicate separate 
processing as we shall see in Zeki’s account.  
68 A. M. Santhouse, R. J. Howard, and D. H. ffytche. "Visual hallucinatory syndromes and the anatomy of the visual 
brain." Brain 123, no. 10 (2000): 2055. 
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means that, if the brain region responsible for processing faces was active during hallucination, 
then subjects experienced face hallucinations, and if the brain region responsible for processing 
color was active during hallucination, then subjects experienced color hallucinations, and so on.  
This means that the subject’s visual hallucinatory experience occurs in the same brain 
region that is responsible for visual perception, and not the isolated region of the mind’s eye where 
imagination takes place69. Here, the reader may claim that since imagination occurs in a different 
brain region, then that may indicate a form of inward thinking which can persist on its own. To 
that we say, we are not attempting to disprove the claim that there are exclusive brain regions 
which are responsible for thinking, of which we take imagination to be a form of, and which more 
or less occur away, though not separate, from perceptual systems. However, we have two 
arguments against this hypothesis of stand-alone imagination: one from brain activity under 
sensory restriction, the other from the perceptual nature of the hallucinatory experience. 
2. The Argument from Brain Activity 
Researchers observed a progressive decline in brain activity in long-term isolation accompanied 
with an increasing arousal in “skin conductance and body movement”70. One explanation here is 
that when the cerebral cortical-reticular, particularly the ascending reticular activating 
system (ARAS), fails to activate the brain given the deficiency of sensory input, there occurs an 
 
69  Note that, while this has been proven in the case of CBS, it has not been conclusively proven in cases of 
hallucinations under sensory restriction due to the difficulty of performing brain imaging without disrupting the 
subject’s isolation, given the invasive nature of fMRI and EEG’s inability to accurately determine the active brain 
region. However, a parallel can be drawn between PD and CBS in that both of them take a distorted visual input and 
produce a hallucinatory experience. Merabet et al. supports this hypothesis as they maintained that “[t]he visual 
hallucinations described in this study fit with the current diagnostic criteria for CBS. First, the hallucinations were 
often vivid and complex, not associated with hallucinations in other sensory modalities, and subjects were insightful 
as to their unreality. Second, the hallucinations were the direct result of compromised visual input, a common cause 
for CBS” - Merabet et al., "Visual hallucinations,” 112. The best data we have at the moment come from Boroojerdi 
et al. 2000 who reported that pre and post deprivation fMRI imaging did show an increase in cortical excitability in 
the visual cortex. 
70 Zuckerman, “Theoretical,” 418. 
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“efferent discharge which creates the neurophysiological equivalent of increased ‘drive’”, which 
accounts for the “increase in autonomic and adrenocortical71 activity”72. This can explain how the 
body enters a state of self-stimulation under SD in order to maintain its touch with the world. 
Accordingly, even in cases of no hallucination, imagination would not persist on its own given the 
automatic response from ARAS to the lack of stimulation which produces bodily sensations that 
occupies the subject’s perception. This gives further support to our initial demonstration that there 
is no biological possibility for a completely sensory restricted experience and shuts the door on 
stand-alone imagination.  
3. The Argument from Binding, or the Perceptual Nature of Hallucinatory 
Experiences 
As Revonsuo and Newman (1999) put it, “[t]he binding problem is, basically, the problem of how 
the unity of conscious perception is brought about by the distributed activities of the central 
nervous system”73. This involves two main issues: segregation and combination. Segregation 
refers to the brain’s ability to segregate distinct elements within a complex sensory input, 
combination refers to the brain’s ability to present such a divers and complex sensory input as a 
single experience. Two main camps emerge as central to the debate.  
In the first camp, focused more on answering the combination question, Crick and Koch 
(1990) argue that binding is what generates the conscious experience, and in the second camp, 
which is focused more on the segregation question, Zeki and Bartels (1999)74 introduce the idea 
 
71 Adrenocortical hormones are responsible for responding to stress. 
72 Zuckerman, “Theoretical,” 418. 
73  Antti Revonsuo & James Newman, “Binding and Consciousness,” Consciousness and Cognition 8, no. 2 
(1999):123.  
74 Semir Zeki and Andreas Bartels, "Toward a theory of visual consciousness," Consciousness and cognition 8, no. 2 
(1999): 225-259. 
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that binding is a post-conscious phenomenon75, which is then formalized in Zeki (2007). The 
difference between the two camps is that for the first, if binding generates consciousness, then to 
accurately perceive a yellow square, processing of the color yellow and the shape square must 
either occur at the same time t, or there must be some place in the brain where the output from the 
processing of color and shape are bound. Their solution to the problem is to suggest that one of 
consciousness’ functions “is to present76 the result of various underlying computations”77 and that 
this involves “an attentional mechanism that temporarily binds the relevant neurons together by 
synchronizing their spikes in 40 Hz oscillations”78, and that “objects for which the binding problem 
has been solved are placed into working memory”79.  
However, what makes the theory of the second camp appealing is the fact that since the 
brain has distinct regions for the processing of different elements of the perceptual experience, or 
what we can refer to as spatial asynchrony in the processing of perceptual data, the processing time 
in each region differs from other regions, which suggests a temporal asynchrony in the processing 
of perceptual data. Experiments show that “[c]olor is perceived before motion by ~80 ms”, and 
“locations are perceived before colors, which are perceived before orientations”80. Moreover, 
because of this difference in the time it takes to perceive different elements of a perceptual 
experience, “subjects consistently mis-bind the color perceived at time t to the motion perceived at 
 
75 n.b this is in one sense of consciousness. We will get back to it in the next chapter. 
76 In section 7 of chapter 4 in his book Consciousness Explained, pp. 85-95, Dennett criticizes such rhetoric which 
presupposes a small homunculus sitting at a Cartesian theater where it is presented with representations from the 
outside world. However, Crick and Koch have argued that “[t]he hypothesis of the homunculus – a conscious entity, 
residing inside the skull, between the eyes and looking out at the world – is, in broad terms, how everyone thinks of 
him- or herself. It would be surprising if this overwhelming illusion did not in some way reflect the general 
organization of the brain” (569). – Francis Crick and Christof Koch, "A neurobiological framework for 
consciousness," in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, ed. Max Velmans and Susan Schneider (Maldon, 
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 569. 
77  Francis Crick and Christof Koch. "Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness." Seminars in the 
Neurosciences, vol. 2 (1990): 272. [emphasis added] 
78 Crick & Koch, “Towards a neurobiological theory,” 272. [emphasis added] 
79 Crick & Koch, “Towards a neurobiological theory,” 272. [emphasis in original]  
80 Semir Zeki, "The disunity of consciousness," Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7, no. 5 (2003): 215. 
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time t-1”81. This means that the theory of the first camp, that “objects for which the binding 
problem has been solved are placed into working memory” is mistaken. Alternatively, what Zeki 
proposed to account for such spatial and temporal asynchrony is that when the brain attempts to 
bind together all the input from the different modalities, it “does not wait for each area to complete 
its processings; rather it simply binds what has been processed and reached a perceptual level”82. 
This translates to: perception as processing is itself a kind of consciousness, while binding as the 
conscious surface connection of the perceptual input from two or more modalities is post-
conscious. In layman terms: you already know what you saw before you knew you saw it83. The 
two types of consciousness, and the two types of knowledge, will be discussed in detail in the 
coming chapters. 
Furthermore, Zeki maintains that there exists no “mechanism to compensate for the 
perceptual time differences between [the brain’s] specialized systems”, nor is there “a final 
‘ perception area ’, equipped with a ‘ synchronizer ’, which would receive information from all the 
different systems and bind it in the appropriate spatiotemporal way”84,85. Thus, it is “not surprising 
 
81 Semir Zeki, "A Theory of Micro-consciousness," in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, ed. Max Velmans 
and Susan Schneider (Maldon, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 584. 
82 Zeki, “A Theory of Micro-consciousness,” 584. 
83 Zeki maintains that “imaging experiments show that the same specific areas of the brain, specialized for the 
processing and seeing of houses or faces respectively, are active, regardless of whether the subjects saw the stimulus 
(were conscious of it) or not. The difference between the two states is that, in the former, the activity is higher than in 
the latter” – Zeki, “A Theory of Micro-consciousness,” 582. The difference between these two types of consciousness 
is referred to by Ned Block as Access Consciousness and Phenomenal Consciousness and we will discuss them in 
more detail in a later chapter. For now, the reader should make the distinction between awareness as a feature of 
phenomenal consciousness, and attention as a feature of access consciousness. What Zeki means by the previous quote 
is that subjects were aware of the stimuli without it occupying their attention; and such awareness was sufficient to 
trigger brain activity and register as a perceptual experience, albeit with a lower activity than in the case of attention. 
84  Konstantinos Moutoussis and Semir Zeki. "A direct demonstration of perceptual asynchrony in 
vision." Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences 264, no. 1380 (1997): 397. 
85 Note here that Zeki understands that this does not answer the question of how or where binding occurs, but that 
perceived consciousness of attributes of a perceptual experience occurs prior to such binding, and not after it as Crick 
and Koch postulated. Note also that he maintains that “it is also true that over longer periods of time, in excess of 500 
ms, we do see different attributes in perfect temporal and spatial registration, which itself demands an explanation” – 
Zeki, “A Theory of Micro-consciousness,” 584. On that view, ultimately, there is nothing that prevents there from 
being a process, perhaps involving higher centers of the brain, which correlates attribute perceived at time t with 
another at time t+1; provided that, in each times, the conscious experience has already been assigned to the attributes 
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that there is no terminal station in the cortex, since activity at each node represents, in a sense, a 
terminal stage of its own specialized process”86. 
Here’s an attempt to make more precise Zeki’s argument: since 
- the processing sites in the visual brain are also perceptual sites; meaning they do not 
need further processing in higher brain centers for recognition to occur87,88, and  
- it has been demonstrated that there exists a temporal asynchrony in the processing of 
perceptual data89, 
Then that strongly suggest that “binding is a post-conscious phenomenon”90. Moreover, Zeki’s 
argument received support from the findings of Zmigrod & Hommel (2010) who reported that 
“binding effects were entirely unrelated to conscious perception”91,92. The main argument they 
were trying to test is the assumption of Treisman (2003) that “feature integration is a necessary 
precondition for coherent conscious perception”93 – the same assumption which Crick & Koch 
adopted. The task they set out to investigate is whether the probability that feature binding occurs 
 
of a perceptual experience before binding takes place, i.e. when two cognitions occur, the experiential value of each 
cognition has already been assigned to each before that cognition is bound to another by the perceptual/processing 
center, and not by a previous cognition. 
86 Zeki and Bartels, "Toward a theory of visual consciousness," 252.  
87 Zeki, “A Theory of Micro-consciousness,” 581. 
88 He refers to “processing sites at which activity can acquire a conscious correlate and does not require further 
processing as essential nodes” – Zeki, “A Theory of Micro-consciousness,” 582. The measured processing is 
correlated to brain activity that appears in imaging where no activation is detected in higher centers while activation 
remains localized in these essential nodes. 
89 Zeki, “The disunity of consciousness,” 215. 
90 Zeki, “A Theory of Micro-consciousness,” 584. [emphasis in original] 
91 Sharon Zmigrod and Bernhard Hommel. "The relationship between feature binding and consciousness: Evidence 
from asynchronous multi-modal stimuli." Consciousness and cognition 20, no. 3 (2011): 592. 
92 We need to voice our reservations regarding this particular claim. Although the jury is still out on the nature of 
binding, and the data suggests that consciousness is a pre-binding phenomenon, dismissing binding altogether seems 
odd. At least, the phenomenal character of a subject’s experience of the world must have an impact on the subject’s 
performance in any test; which means that, even if immediate binding of features does not correlate to conscious 
experience, phenomenal binding of relating together certain environmental sensations should not be disqualified from 
the discussion. In this particular case, we agree with a limited portion of the theory of the first camp. We include the 
study as support for Zeki since it further supports the data on subjects continuing to mis-bind; which stands in contrast 
to the central claims of the first camp. We will have more to say on that once we have introduced our Blockian model 
of consciousness.  
93 Zmigrod and Hommel, “feature binding and consciousness,” 586. 
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is correlated with “the probability of perceiving the bound features as belonging to the same 
perceptual event, or, more specifically, as occurring at the same time”94. Consistent with the 
findings from Zeki (2003), they found no such correlation, which suggested that intermodal feature 
binding has nothing to do with perception of multi-modal features as belonging to the same event95. 
In other words, these findings suggest that “conscious experience of unity is not a prerequisite for, 
or a direct consequence of binding”96. 
If we add to this Ffytche demonstration that hallucination occurs in the same brain regions 
responsible for visual processing, then we see no reason for binding to treat hallucinations as 
anything but cognitions97 since their perception has occurred already where they are processed. 
And if we take the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience to be the combination of all 
attributes of the perceptual experience which have been processed at time t, i.e. the phenomenal 
character as the result of binding, then hallucinations too have a phenomenal character. This runs 
counter to the disjunctivist view which states that “when one is hallucinating one’s experience 
lacks phenomenal character altogether”98,99. 
 
 
 
94 Zmigrod and Hommel, “feature binding and consciousness,” 592. 
95 Zmigrod and Hommel, “feature binding and consciousness,” 592. 
96 Zmigrod and Hommel, “feature binding and consciousness,” 586. 
97 On Peirce’s definition, “[a]ny cognition is a consciousness of the object as represented” – Peirce, C. S. "Questions 
Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man." The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2, no. 2 (1868): 107. 
98  Fiona Macpherson, “The Philosophy and Psychology of Hallucination: An Introduction,” in Hallucination: 
Philosophy and psychology, ed. Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013), 21. 
99 Of the same opinion is Merleau-Ponty who maintains that “[h]allucinations are played out on a stage different from 
that of the perceived world, and are in a way super-imposed” – Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology of perception. 
(London; New York: Routledge, 1966), 395. And thus, argues that “the thing in hallucination is never seen and is 
never visible” – Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 397. However, the very example he presents, “‘Can’t you hear my 
voices?’ asks the patient; ‘then I must be the only one to hear them’” Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 395, is proof 
enough that the experience has been veridical enough for the experiencer to inquire whether or not it is intersubjective. 
Thus, much like the disjunctivists, Merleau-Ponty’s argument that “[t]he fact that the hallucination does not take its 
place in the stable and intersubjective world means that it lacks the fullness” is provably false Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology, 395. 
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Conclusion 
To this point, we have argued two things: first, that in the low end of sensory restriction, inward 
thinking does not occur since thinking is accompanied by sensations – which constitute an element 
of the phenomenal character of a subject’s experience, and second, that in the high end of sensory 
restriction, inward thinking does not occur since thinking is accompanied by cognitions – which 
constitute an element of the phenomenal character of a subject’s experience. Thus, there exists no 
thinking without a phenomenal character involved in it. 
What this also means, is that for consciousness to continue its wakeful manifestation, 
thought as we identified it earlier, it needs to keep a certain level of stimulation going – ranging 
from bodily sensations to a full positing of a world in hallucination – in order to have something 
to attach thought to. In other words, consciousness is not only stimuli-receiving but also a stimuli-
seeking 100 , and sometimes stimuli-generating, machine. By this, we take it that we have 
demonstrated that: all thinking involves an underlying phenomenal character giving how 
consciousness is a stimuli-seeking machine.  
 
Anticipating Criticism: Neuroplasticity as a Counter Argument 
A counter argument can be made by utilizing neuroplasticity. What neuroplasticity means is the 
brains ability to change its structure to optimize the flow of information. A case can be made that, 
under prolonged sensory deprivation, the brain can start rewiring itself to ensure resuming its 
 
100 Psychologists call this “stimulus-action hunger” where subjects under conditions of sensory restriction seek to 
stimulate themselves through an increase in verbal output, somatic movement, etc. However, just like SD raises “the 
desire to think and to speak, […], at the same time, it appears that deprivation techniques disrupt the organized flow 
both of intrinsically motivated cognitive behavior and of its overt indicator, speech”. This is why other indicators, 
biometric in nature, such as autonomic and adrenocortical activity, better help account for such level of drive. – Peter 
Suedfeld, "Changes in Intellectual Performance and in Susceptibility to Influence,” in Sensory Deprivation: Fifteen 
Years of Research, ed. John P. Zubek (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 132. 
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normal functions. Of course, we do not disagree with the idea since it has been empirically proven, 
however, we contest using it as an argument for the possibility of inward thinking. Consider the 
1981 study by D. A. Winfield on “the effects of postnatal visual deprivation on synaptic density 
in the visual cortex”101 . In this study, Winfield sutured “the eyelids over one eye in 6 kittens and 
over both eyes in 4 kittens”, under ether anaesthesia, shortly before the natural time of eye-
opening102. The interesting results came from the bilaterally visually deprived kittens. Their early 
synaptogenesis paralleled that of normal kittens, and their synaptic density was slightly below 
average after 40 days, and by the age of 70 days, their synaptic density deteriorated to 26% below 
average. Interestingly, however, unlike the control group who started synaptic pruning normally 
at the age of 70, the bilaterally restricted kittens showed a slow increase in synaptic density up to 
13% above normal by the age of 110 days, and even showed a 22% increase compared to control 
animals after reaching maturity. This shows that “synaptic pruning is indeed influenced by 
environmental input”, and that “that immature visual cortex, deprived of its normal input from the 
eyes, develops other afferent connections, including somatosensory ones, which form functioning 
systems”103. 
Moreover, other researchers reported that, in visually restricted kittens, neurons fail to 
respond to any visual stimuli, “although they are ‘spontaneously’ active”104, despite the fact that 
“behaviorally, these animals appear blind when the opaque lenses are removed”105. Keep in mind 
that neuroplasticity goes both ways, which means that, these kittens, when later are consistently 
introduced to normal visual stimuli, “some degree of recovery of vision over time does occur even 
 
101 Peter R. Huttenlocher, Neural Plasticity. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 58.  
102 D. A. Winfield, "The postnatal development of synapses in the visual cortex of the cat and the effects of eyelid 
closure." Brain research, 208 (1981), 166. 
103 Huttenlocher, Neural Plasticity, 60. 
104 Huttenlocher, Neural Plasticity, 90. 
105 Huttenlocher, Neural Plasticity, 90. 
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when bilateral visual deprivation extends from birth to maturity”106. The interesting question here 
is: if these neurons continue firing without responding to stimuli, what kind of connections did 
they develop? “Might they have been recruited for functions other than visual?”107. There is a 
suggestion that the answer to that question is affirmative, since “inputs from the visual cortex to 
the suprasylvian association cortex are replaced by increased auditory and somatosensory 
inputs”108. Behavioral testing of the animals showed an “improved sound localization” compared 
to control animals, which suggests that these adaptations are functionally significant.  
What this attempts to show is that neuroplasticity is actively attempting to optimize neural 
connection to receive the best possible quality of stimuli from the environment, and when it is 
unable to do so, it rewires the brain to divert resources in order to enhance the quality of feedback. 
And when the reason for the deprivation is removed, the brain attempts to wire back the 
connections to keep the feedback from the previously restricted modality flowing. Accordingly, 
we can conclude that the brain does whatever at its power to ensure that the connection with 
worldly stimuli is optimal, which gives further supports to our claim that the nature of 
consciousness is outwardly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 Huttenlocher, Neural Plasticity, 90. 
107 Huttenlocher, Neural Plasticity, 90. 
108 Huttenlocher, Neural Plasticity, 110. 
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Chapter II: On Phenomenal Concepts 
In the previous chapter, we argued that all thinking always involves Phenomenal Character given 
that the nature of consciousness is being outwardly. Towards proving the truth of this proposition, 
we presented Zeki’s micro-consciousness theory and concluded that since binding is a post-
conscious phenomenon, and since the perception as processing of stimuli itself is conscious, then 
the perceiver already knows what they saw before they know they saw it. We will refer to this type 
of knowledge as consisting of phenomenal concepts and will discuss in a minute where that term 
comes from. In this chapter, we want to take a deeper look at this knowledge claim, i.e. that there 
exists a type of knowledge of the world that is strictly phenomenal. Towards that end, we will need 
to answer, first, what is the nature of phenomenal concepts? (The Epistemic Question), second, 
are phenomenal concepts their own distinct category? do they really exist? (The Ontological 
Question), and third, to what extent do phenomenal concepts exert control over behavior? (The 
Behavioral Question). This part of the thesis will attempt at arguing the soundness of the second 
proposition which states that all phenomenal character involves phenomenal concepts. Before we 
begin to answer the epistemic question, a prologue is necessarily due.  
Prologue: A/P Consciousness 
Based on the work of Daniel Schacter, Ned Block proposes a theory of consciousness according 
to which there are, in fact, two kinds of consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness (P-
Consciousness) and Access Consciousness (A-Consciousness). Here’s how Block envisions it: P-
Consciousness is “experience,” or more precisely, following Thomas Nagel, “what makes a state 
phenomenally conscious is that there is something ‘it is like’ […] to be in that state”109, i.e. 
 
109 Ned Block. “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” in Consciousness, Function, and Representation: 
Collected Papers (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007): 163. 
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something it is like to experience the redness of a specific bottle in this room under this lighting.. 
The function of P-Consciousness, according to Block, is to act as “the gateway between the special 
purpose ‘knowledge’ modules and the central Executive System that is in charge of direct control 
of reasoning, reporting, and guiding action”110. The operation of P-Consciousness as a gateway 
involves “integrating the outputs of the specialized modules and transmitting the integrated 
contents to mechanisms of reasoning and control of action and reporting”111; the latter mechanisms 
are understood to be part of A-Consciousness. A state “is access-conscious roughly speaking if its 
content—what is represented by the perceptual state—is processed via that information-processing 
function, that is, if its content gets to the Executive System, whereby it can be used to control 
reasoning and behavior”112. 
It is important to note here that Zeki credits Block for the distinction between micro and 
macro-consciousnesses stating that “[m]icro- and macro-consciousnesses with their individual 
temporal hierarchies really refer to what has been coined as phenomenal consciousness, as opposed 
to access consciousness” 113 . P-Consciousness is similar to Zeki’s understanding of binding. 
Binding occurs after the specialized ‘knowledge’ modules, which Zeki calls essential nodes, have 
already processed the stimuli and are ready to relay the information to the higher areas of the brain, 
which are the mechanisms of reasoning and control of action and reporting. Now that we have 
established the distinction between the two types of consciousness, we turn to ask our first 
question: what is the nature of this knowledge generated by phenomenal character? 
 
 
 
110 Block, “On a Confusion,” 163. 
111 Block, “On a Confusion,” 163. 
112 Block, “On a Confusion,” 164. 
113 Zeki, “A Theory of Micro-consciousness,” 585. 
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Section I: The Epistemic Question 
- The purpose of this section is to propose the Blockian vision of the nature of phenomenal 
concepts and argue that the meaning of phenomenal concepts depends, in part, on the effect 
of the phenomenal character of the experience on a subject. This is based on Block’s 
hypothesis that information travel from the specialized modules to A-consciousness 
through P-consciousness. 
In his rebutting of the Property Dualism Argument, Block introduced the idea of a phenomenal 
concept. A phenomenal concept is “individuated with respect to fundamental uses that involve the 
actual occurrence of phenomenal properties. In these fundamental uses, a simultaneously 
occurring experience is used to think about that very experience. No one could have a phenomenal 
concept if they could not in some way relate the concept to such fundamental uses in which the 
subject actually has a simultaneous instance of the phenomenal quality”114. Note that a phenomenal 
concept should be distinguished from what we will call a linguistic symbolic concept. A symbolic 
concept does not rely directly on the actual occurrence of a certain phenomenal quality, yet may 
involves a multiplicity of phenomenal concepts. It relies fundamentally on the Executive system’s 
operations of information-processing, which makes it primarily A-Conscious despite, like every 
other A-operation, relying on P-Consciousness. 
This idea of a phenomenal concept allows him to argue against the Property Dualism, 
argued for by Frank Jackson, who claimed that Mary115 would know something different when she 
 
114 Ned Block. “Max Black’s Objection to Mind-Body Identity,” in Consciousness, Function, and Representation: 
Collected Papers (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007): 438. 
115 Frank Jackson was the first to introduce Mary’s problem in his 1982 paper titled “Epiphenomenal Qualia”. In it, 
he argues: “Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and 
white room via a black and white television monitor. She specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, 
let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the 
sky, and use terms like 'red', 'blue', and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wave-length combinations from 
the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal 
chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence 'The sky is blue'. […] What will 
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experiences the color red for the first time. Rather than her learning a new “property” of the color 
red, Block argues that “the new knowledge acquired does not show that there are any properties 
beyond the physical properties” since, in personal encounter of the color red, there exists only “a 
new concept but no new properties or facts”116, i.e. a new way of conceiving of red. Block 
continues to say that the manner in which Mary would express what she learned about the 
phenomenal concept of seeing the color red is something like: “Oh, so this is what it is like to see 
red”117, where the italicized ‘this’ would refer to what we arbitrarily call ‘redness’.  
 However, since P-consciousness is the binding of the information relayed from the 
specialized modules regarding a perceptual experience, and A-consciousness involves the 
mechanisms of reasoning and control of action and reporting, then Mary’s reporting on the 
phenomenal concept of ‘redness’ is actually not the true expression of the phenomenal concept 
itself, but rather a translation of the phenomenal concept into a linguistic symbolic concept through 
engaging the reporting aspect of A-consciousness. That is to say, that the true expression of the 
phenomenal concept is incommunicable. This is precisely the reason why it is impossible to 
explain redness to a blind person: we can communicate the linguistic symbolic concept with the 
word-token ‘red’, but we cannot communicate the phenomenal concept about the phenomenal 
character of a definite redness. Block himself seems to have something similar in mind when he 
explains that, “[i]n the case of language-using organisms such as ourselves, a major symptom of 
 
happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn 
anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. 
But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo 
there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false.” – Frank Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia." The 
Philosophical Quarterly 32, no. 127 (1982): 130. 
116 Block, “Max,” 438. 
117 Block, “Max,” 441. 
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access-consciousness would be reportability” 118 , and since phenomenal concepts are 
incommunicable, then what is communicable must be another type of concepts, i.e. symbolic. 
Now, since both the phenomenal content and concept are interlinked given the condition 
of actual occurrence which guarantees their simultaneous generation, and if the phenomenal 
concept of a definite redness is instantiated from the phenomenal character of experiencing a 
definite color red, then the meaning of the phenomenal concept of redness should depend, in part119, 
on the effect of the phenomenal character of experiencing the color red. The question here is: what 
would be the effect of the phenomenal character of experiencing the color red? Remember that in 
the first chapter we identified phenomenal character roughly as any subjective experience under 
the threshold of an explicitly propositional thought, including sensations, cognitions, etc. But since 
cognitions are under the control of internal mental processes, and since it is impossible to account 
for any propositional thought at any given time by way other than reportability—which would 
translate the P-conscious into an A-conscious state—the only thing we can account for of a 
phenomenal character qua phenomenal character is feelings. Any feeling must involve a correlate 
activity from the sympathetic nervous system as an involuntary reaction of the body to external 
stimulation, be it a perceptual experience – e.g. the color red or a cardinal stimulus, or direct 
sensation – e.g. the sensation of pain. The sympathetic nervous system, which is part of the larger 
autonomic nervous system, releases the appropriate chemicals in order to induce the correlative 
feeling—a process that happens automatically. Accordingly, we can claim that one of the areas 
 
118 Block, “Max,” 144. 
119 We say part and not all because, as we shall see in the following section, the meaning of a stimulus can be just the 
discrimination of certain information about said stimulus – specifically in the case of the absence of p-conscious 
experience. Block seems to agree that phenomenal concepts are “partially constituted’ by phenomenal qualities”. – 
Levin, Janet. "What is a phenomenal concept?" in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays 
on Consciousness and Physicalism, eds. Torin Alter & Sven Walter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 91. 
 
 
 
31 
where we can measure that phenomenal character is the emotional effect the color has over the 
subject. The question now becomes, how do we measure such effect?  
In a 1994 study by Patricia Valdez and Albert Mehrabian, they were able to determine that, 
antithetical to brighter colors, darker colors were linked to lower pleasure (P), higher arousal (A) 
and higher dominance-inducing (D)120; or to put it concisely: “Brightness = +P -A -D, Darkness = 
-P +A +D”121. At the same time, other research that provided measures of aggression and anger 
based on the same parameters of pleasure, arousal and dominance, arrived at the following values: 
“Aggression = -.36 P +.20 A +.28 D, Anger = -.74 P +.36 A +.09 D”. By correlating these results, 
Valdez and Mehrabian concluded that “darker colors are likely to elicit feelings that are similar to 
(or weaker variants of) anger, hostility, or aggression. Darker colors are also expected to elicit 
feelings that constitute components of aggression, anger, or hostility (e.g., displeasure, high 
arousal, or dominance)”122. Now, while maintaining the condition of actual occurrence, and if we 
now take the meaning of a phenomenal concept to depend in part on the effect of phenomenal 
character, then we can claim that in perceiving a darker color, the phenomenal character of that 
perceptual experience would include feelings of arousal and dominance, while the phenomenal 
concept that manifests inches towards anger, hostility, or aggression, or elicit feelings of 
displeasure, high arousal, or dominance.  
The counterargument here might go along these lines: feelings as involuntary sympathetic 
nervous system reactions are not accompanied with any phenomenal concepts, but only 
 
120 The Pleasure-Arousal-Dominance (PAD) Emotion Model was suggested by Mehrabian and Russell (1974) where 
they studied pleasure (+P) – displeasure(-P), arousal (+A) – nonarousal (-A), and dominance (+D) – submissiveness 
(-D) as a way to provide a general description of emotions. Some of the readings under that model include: +P+A+D 
correlated with feelings of being “admired, bold, creative, powerful, vigorous”, +P – A – D correlated with feelings 
of being “consoled, docile, protected, sleepy, tranquilized” – Valdez and Mehrabian, “Effects of Color,” 395. 
121  Patricia Valdez and Albert Mehrabian. "Effects of color on emotions." Journal of experimental psychology: 
General 123, no. 4 (1994): 407. 
122 Valdez and Mehrabian, “Effects of color,” 408. 
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phenomenal characters that are accompanied by concepts. Each category, phenomenal characters 
and concepts, is distinct on its own and there’s no overlap between the two. The idea that is 
generated in someone’s stream of consciousness when they see red is the same as when they think 
red. To answer these potential disagreements, we now turn to try and answer our ontological 
question.  
 
Section II: The Ontological Question: Two Possible Routes 
- So far, we’ve argued that part of the meaning of a phenomenal concept is the phenomenal 
character a perceptual experience has over the subject. What this might suggest is a 
deflationary approach where it might be argued that phenomenal concepts are just feelings, 
or an eliminative approach whereby phenomenal concepts are denied altogether. The 
purpose of this section is to argue for the existence of phenomenal concepts as their distinct 
category of concepts and to refute the attempt to collapse phenomenal concepts into 
phenomenal character or deny their existence. The idea is to showcase a special type of 
direct connection between the specialized modules and A-consciousness in the case in 
which there is no P-consciousness which allows the executive system to guess (or vaguely 
discriminate) information about certain stimuli, despite the information not passing 
through, or registering any feelings, in P-consciousness. We believe this is a common 
mistake since guessing and certainty are two different epistemic modes which should not 
be conflated.  
To answer our question here, we need to untangle phenomenal concepts and phenomenal contents. 
That is to say, we need to find cases in which, on the one hand, a stimulus has no phenomenal 
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character while, on the other, a phenomenal concept can be observed taking part in rational 
behavior.  
We have seen in the previous chapter how Zeki utilizes the temporal discrepancy in processing 
certain stimuli to argue his case for micro-consciousness. Zeki’s method does not allow us to 
investigate each of them separately. On the other hand, Block’s hypothesis allows us to do exactly 
that. Block presented his hypothesis in light of a discussion of patients with damage to their 
primary visual cortex which results in blind areas in their visual field. When presented with a 
stimulus—say a vertical line—in their blind field, the patients deny having any representation of 
that stimulus. Remarkably, some blindsight patients, despite having no A-conscious representation 
of the stimulus, “are able to ‘guess’ reliably about certain features of the stimulus, features having 
to do with motion, location, direction”123, allowing them to discriminate certain forms without 
having an A-conscious representation of the stimulus. We will first present Block’s explanation of 
the phenomenon, then our hypothesis of how we think this process occurs. 
1. The Specialized Module Route 
The explanation Block provides is that the specialized module responsible for processing the 
stimuli “has some information about the verticality of the stimulus”124, or, as Zeki would put it, 
has already processed the stimulus. Block maintains that, in the case of a blindsight patient,  
The pathways between this specialized module and the phenomenal consciousness system 
have been damaged, creating the ‘blind field,’ so the patient has no phenomenally 
conscious experience of the line, and hence his Executive System has no information about 
whether the line is vertical or horizontal. But the specialized module has a direct 
connection to the Response System, so when the subject is given a binary choice, the 
specialized module can somehow directly affect the response.125,126 
 
123 Block, “On a Confusion,” 160. 
124 Block, “On a Confusion,” 165. 
125 Block, “On a Confusion,” 165. [emphasis added] 
126 Note here the connections Block is making: the specialized module (the area of processing on Zeki’s theory) has 
direct connection to both a response system (that system which is responsible for communication in the case of the 
blindsight patient) and phenomenal consciousness (that is the totality of experience, which would equate to post-
binding on Zeki’s theory). Two things are worth noting here: 1) Block maintains that the explanation he gives is 
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Notice here how Block contradicts his own condition of information traveling from the specialized 
module to P-consciousness and then to A-consciousness. Instead, he proposes here that 
information which is sufficient for recognition but are not available for the free use of reasoning 
can yet directly affect behavior, by traveling directly to the response system, bypassing both P- 
and A-consciousness. Thus, he argues, “when a representation is not conscious—as in the 
blindsight patient’s blindfield perceptual representations—it can influence behavior behind the 
scenes, but only when the representation is conscious does it play a rational role.”127.  
However, there is an issue with Block’s proposal of taking the route of the specialized 
module as being able to “somehow” affect the response of the blindsight patient. That issue is 
coming from Block himself, whom we quoted earlier as saying that “[i]n the case of language-
using organisms such as ourselves, a major symptom of access-consciousness would be 
reportability” 128 . If reportability is a major symptom of access-consciousness, how can 
reportability, at the same time, be considered as mere behavior and not a rational response? How 
can voluntary speech, which is the most elaborate manifestation of A-conscious rationality, come 
under the control of a single specialized module? Even more puzzling, would any specialized 
module be able to take control over any response system at any moment? What if two specialized 
modules are sending urgent contradictory information at the same time? Shouldn’t P-
consciousness act as a moderator, since already one of its functions is “integrating the outputs of 
the specialized modules”? 
 
“highly speculative” – Block, “On a Confusion,” 166, and 2) In what seems to be an endorsement of this explanation, 
Block later maintains, in the same article, that “[i]n blindsight, both A-consciousness and P-consciousness (I assume) 
are gone, just as in normal perception, both are present. So blindsight is yet another case in which P-consciousness 
and A-consciousness are both present or both absent”. – Block, “On a Confusion,” 194. We decided to take on Block’s 
explanation based on this later endorsement. 
127 Block, “On a Confusion,” 160. [emphasis added] 
128 Ned Block. “What Is Dennett’s Theory a Theory Of?,” in Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected 
Papers (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007): 144 
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Hypothetically, for this to be correct, this would need a case where there is an observable 
effect of a specific specialized module over a specific splanchnic nerve, leading to a specific bodily 
reaction. And even then, P-consciousness would need to act as the link and regulator between 
different information coming from different specialized modules and the responses to trigger. 
Surely, the specialized modules can have a say regarding the urgency of a certain stimulus—think 
of a ball hurling towards your face—yet it would still require binding in order for the information 
to be integrated to make sure other modules are not reporting a more urgent stimulus – say 
reporting pain from your foot caught on fire.  
The questions do not stop here129 , despite the fact that this method is clearly highly 
speculative. Nevertheless, in order to do justice to Block’s view, let us look at an argument that 
can be in favor of what he presents. Consider Wernicke’s speech aphasia, where  
language output is fluent – that is, normal in mean phrase length, generally sentence-length, 
and using all grammatical elements available in the language. Content may be extremely 
paraphasic or empty. Paraphasic speech conforms to the general rules of the language but 
contains substitutions at the phonemic level (phonemic paraphasias such as smoon for 
spoon), the word level (semantic paraphasias such as cup for spoon), or entirely novel but 
phonologically legal words (neologisms such as snopel)130.  
 
This type of aphasia is associated with damage to the superior temporal gyrus with more severe 
effects if the damage extends to middle and interior temporal gyri131. Wernicke’s aphasia requires 
damage to all three regions specifically because, despite the fact that cross-modal semantic 
 
129 Another reason why this route is questionable is the nature of the operation of guessing itself. If guessing between 
two options involves the elimination of one of them, then there needs to be some sort of verification mechanism 
involved in that elimination. If phenomenal content acts as this verification mechanism, whereby, if the phenomenal 
concept processed does not correlate with the phenomenal content of the perceptual experience the subject becomes 
aware that this perceptual experience is a hallucination, then this begs the question: what would be the elimination 
mechanism involved in the correct guessing of the blindsight patients? One more reason to question this route is: if 
we consider the sympathetic nervous system’s response to external stimuli the standard for what a response system 
should be, meaning that response systems have to be involuntary, how could we consider the production of conscious 
speech to fall under the same umbrella of involuntary activity without claiming that we have no ability to reason?  
130  Michael P. Alexander, "Aphasia I: Clinical and Anatomical Issues,” Patient-based Approaches to Cognitive 
Neuroscience (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000): 184. 
131 Alexander, “Aphasia I,” 185. 
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knowledge emerges from multiple regions in the posterior association cortex, “available evidence 
highlights the inferior temporal and middle temporal/angular gyrus transition as the particularly 
key regions for word retrieval”.132  
 The reason we are bringing up Wernicke’s aphasia here is that this is a case where the 
speech (response) module which is responsible for semantic formulation is having trouble 
translating the orders from the executive system into produced speech. This type of aphasia is not 
associated with cognitive issues on the level of formulating ideas, but only on the level of 
producing the correct counterparts to these ideas in semantic form. This means that, in this case, 
the executive system does not have total authority over speech production, allowing for the speech 
module itself to determine the content of the speech produced (albeit still relatively similar to that 
dictated by the executive system). On these lines, one could argue that in the case of the blindsight 
patient being shown a vertical line, the executive system, albeit without physical damage to the 
temporal gyrus, could, in theory, delegate the responsibility of the response to the response module, 
which turns to the specialized module responsible for processing shapes to arrive at the correct 
answer regarding whether the line is horizontal or vertical. This, however, will need to entail the 
assumption that speech itself can be understood as part of the involuntary response system of the 
body. There can be an argument for that, given that in thinking what we speak, we do not stop to 
think about the language we speak it through. A counter view to that would be based on the 
understanding that language takes advantage of the multimodality of the sensory-motor system, 
states that there exists “no single ‘module’ for language—and that human language makes use of 
mechanisms also present in nonhuman primates”133. 
 
132 Alexander, “Aphasia I,” 185.  
133 Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff. "The Brain's Concepts: The Role of The Sensory-Motor System in Conceptual 
Knowledge." Cognitive neuropsychology 22, no. 3-4 (2005): 456.  
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Our aim here is not to outright argue against Block’s vision, especially since we believe it 
can work in certain cases. Yet we find it unconvincing in answering the question: how could there 
be accurate reporting on a specific feature of a stimulus which cannot be seen? Block offers little 
more than claiming that “the specialized module can somehow directly affect the response” 134. 
What we want to provide here is an alternative route that shows how information in the specialized 
module can affect rational behavior without registering a phenomenal character at all, essentially 
arguing for the existence of phenomenal concepts. We now turn to the second route.  
2. The Phenomenal Concept Route 
Our proposed argument for the nature of the operation by which blindsight patients are able 
to successfully guess simple facts regarding stimuli will depend on the truth of three premises. We 
will proceed by presenting the evidence we have for the truth of each of the premises, followed by 
our conclusion. 
o Premise 1: The Nature of Concepts 
In their book Philosophy in the Flesh, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson operate within the 
parameters of the understanding that reasoning by means of concepts requires that “the neural 
structures of the brain carry out that reasoning”135. On their understanding of embodiment, “the 
same neural system engaged in perception (or in bodily movement) plays a central role in 
conception”136,137. They propose what they call “primary metaphors” as the vehicles of mental 
 
134 Block, “On a Confusion,” 165. [emphasis added] 
135 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh. (New York: Basic books, 1999), 64, E-Book. 
136 Lakoff and Johnson, “Philosophy,” 132, E-Book 
137 It is important to note that the proof Lakoff and Johnson have of their theory is one of possibility and not of actuality. 
Meaning that they do not have “any strong neurophysiological evidence, say from PET scan or functional MRI results, 
that the same neural mechanisms used in perception and movement are also used in abstract reasoning”. – Lakoff and 
Johnson, “Philosophy,” 133, E-Book. However, in the absence of a neurophysiological proof, clinical 
neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience have been able to step in and provide sound arguments. The first 
established an existing relationship between “given patterns of localised brain damage and corresponding deficits in 
conceptual knowledge”, and the second identified “which brain regions are activated by different conceptual 
categories” through brain imaging experiments. – Gallese and Lakoff, “The Brain's Concepts,” 457. The problem here 
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representations used for thinking. A primary metaphor “allows conventional mental imagery from 
sensorimotor domains to be used for domains of subjective experience”, such as when we conceive 
that failure to understand something can be associated with it flying over our heads, or that “prices 
rose” is understood in the same manner as “more is up” which is “a subjective judgment of quantity 
[that] is conceptualized in terms of the sensorimotor experience of verticality”138. Christopher 
Johnson hypothesizes that, in early development, the concepts of verticality and quantity are 
conflated with one another. Later on, the concepts are separated, yet are connected by “a cross-
domain mapping between the sensorimotor concept of verticality (the source domain) and the 
subjective judgment of quantity”139. 
Christopher Johnson studied the utterances recorded over the course of the language 
development of a child named Shem. In his analysis, Johnson attempted to determine the exact 
point at which Shem became able to use “I see what you’re saying” as a metaphoric representation 
of “I understand what you mean”; where “[s]eeing is the metaphorical source domain used to 
conceptualize knowledge, but it is not used literally”140. The interesting part is that, before Shem 
was able to use this metaphor, he entered a stage of conflation between the two concepts, where 
knowing and seeing domains were confused with one another. This conflation allows for the 
cultivation of a primary metaphor where, after the period of conflation is over, the child would be 
capable of differentiating between the two concepts. Conflations, Lakoff and Johnson argue, “are 
instances of coactivation of both domains, during which permanent neural connections between 
the domains develop”141. 
 
is, and why these two statements sound like they’re contradicting one another, is that “to date no such convincing 
solution has been proposed” regarding which of the number of theories explaining the extent of conceptual knowledge 
structure dependent on sensorimotor systems. – Gallese and Lakoff, “The Brain's Concepts,” 457. 
138 Lakoff and Johnson, “Philosophy,” 159, E-Book 
139 Lakoff and Johnson, “Philosophy,” 160, E-Book. 
140 Lakoff and Johnson, “Philosophy,” 161, E-Book 
141 Lakoff and Johnson, “Philosophy,” 163, E-Book 
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Christopher Johnson’s work paved the way for Joseph Grady’s theory of primary 
metaphors which tried to explain how subjective judgment is based on sensorimotor domains. 
Lakoff and Johnson describe primary metaphors as “an atomic component of the molecular 
structure of complex metaphors”142, and they stress that they are “not the result of a conscious 
multistage process of interpretation. Rather it is a matter of immediate conceptual mapping via 
neural connections”143. One example of a primary metaphor is “Similarity Is Closeness”, where 
the subjective judgment “similarity” is tied to the sensorimotor domain “closeness” where the 
primary experience involved in both is observing how similar things are clustered together, such 
as flowers or trees. What this means is that the perceptual neural structure which is involved in 
observing the closeness of things is the same one responsible for discerning that these close things, 
more often than not, are similar. To put it simply, the ability to think a concept such as grasping, 
“makes use of the same neural substrate as performing and perceiving grasping”144, and the ability 
to think a concept such as similarity involves the same neural substrate as perceiving closeness. In 
other words, conception piggybacks on perception145.  
What this essentially means is that: a) at least in their early stages of formation, concepts 
are interlinked to phenomenal characters (such as intimacy correlating with proximity), and b) that 
concepts depend on their formation on sensorimotor and perceptual systems (the concept grasping 
making use of same neural substrate as performing and perceiving grasping). This is significant 
because: a) it opens up the possibility that a phenomenal character can be identified as the source 
of a concept or a number of concepts, and b) that in thinking with these concepts, the same neural 
substrata of experiencing this phenomenal character is involved as well. If we take these two ideas 
 
142 Lakoff and Johnson, “Philosophy,” 164, E-Book 
143 Lakoff and Johnson, “Philosophy,” 180, E-Book 
144 Gallese and Lakoff, “The Brain's Concepts,” 456 
145 Lakoff and Johnson, “Philosophy,” 78, E-Book. 
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and apply them to the case of blindsight patients being presented with a vertical line, then since 
the perceptual system of the patient is capable of discriminating the shape it sees and sending the 
information down to P-consciousness (a condition argued for by Zeki’s micro-consciousness 
theory), and if this entails firing the same neural path as the ones involved in symbolic concepts 
which are part of A-consciousness, then the executive system can determine the range of 
possibilities involved in firing this particular neural path and then make a guess based on it, all 
without the information registering in P-consciousness. What we’re saying is that since the neural 
structure of concepts as we think of them in A-consciousness converges with the neural structure 
of phenomenal experience from sensorimotor and perceptual systems, then the activation of the 
latter should entail an activation of the first. The difference in the blindsight patient is the absence 
of a phenomenal character which, in the case of normal population, would act as a verification tool 
to decisively determine which of the range of possibilities is the correct one, i.e. how a specific 
stimulus usually used to appear to the subject. This would be the reason why the blindsight patient 
is able to guess but not know whether the line is horizontal or vertical. We still argue that the 
phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is as important as the phenomenal concept 
generated by that perceptual experience. Neither of them alone can accurately determine what is 
it the subject is perceiving. The coupling of discrimination of the phenomenal concept and the 
experience of the phenomenal character is what guarantees the validity of perception. 
o Premise 2: Perceptual Discrimination 
This premise is a further elaboration on Zeki’s thesis of micro-consciousness to highlight 
two things: the hierarchical nature of processing certain features of stimuli, and the uncoupling of 
awareness and discrimination as two distinct capacities. Take the processing of the full experience 
of color in three distinct cortical stages, each with its own function. The first two stages, in V1/V2 
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and V4, represent the computational aspect of color perception, and are concerned with the 
registration and the comparative processing of color, respectively146. The third stage, beyond V4, 
is concerned more “not with computing colours in an abstract sense, but with object and surface 
colours”147. Accordingly, the processing of color, in the model of Zeki and Marini, reconsolidated 
both computational theories of color processing with cognitive ones that depended on memory and 
object recognition. But most importantly for our purposes, it showed that the profiling of color 
itself does not need processing beyond V4 before it is successful; i.e. discrimination of color does 
not require more complex processing, while connecting the color with the object/surface requires 
further processing elsewhere in the brain.  
Similarly, the discrimination of certain features of stimuli does not require further 
hierarchical processing. For example, Zeki and Ffytche were able to demonstrate that activation in 
area V5, which is critical for perception of visual motion, in a blindsight patient, despite the patient 
suffering from legions in V1 area, correlated with the patient’s ability to discriminate the type of 
motion (fast or slow) involved in the presented stimulus. In other words, activation of V5 “elicit[s] 
a conscious discrimination”148 in the blindsight patient, without necessarily being aware of the 
stimulus in play149. This suggested that the coupling of awareness, understood as reporting a 
 
146 The first stage involving V1 and possibly V2, is “concerned mainly with registering the presence and intensity of 
different wavelengths, and with wavelength differencing”. – Zeki and Marini, “Three Cortical Stages,” 1669. The 
second stage, involving V4, performs two processes: “One process would consist of generating a lightness at a given 
waveband for a given surface in the field of view, by comparing the intensity of light reflected from that surface with 
the intensity of the same light reflected from other surfaces. The second comparison would be to compare the lightness 
of a patch produced by at least two different wavebands, the comparison of comparisons leading to colour.” – Zeki 
and Marini, “Three Cortical Stages,” 1680.  
147 Semir Zeki and Ludovica Marini. "Three Cortical Stages of Colour Processing in The Human Brain." Brain: a 
journal of neurology 121, no. 9 (1998): 1680. 
148 Semir Zeki and Dominic H. Ffytche. "The Riddoch Syndrome: Insights into The Neurobiology of Conscious 
Vision." Brain: a journal of neurology 121, no. 1 (1998): 42. 
149 Zeki and ffytche reported that their patient’s “awareness for a given task varied between 0 and 80% on different 
occasions while his discrimination level remained unchanged”. However, they also asserted that the patient’s 
“discriminatory performance can vary for the same task, without necessarily entailing a parallel fluctuation in 
awareness”. Zeki and ffytche hypothesized that this uncoupling between awareness and discrimination is caused by 
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perceptual experience, and discrimination, understood as identifying features of presented stimulus, 
in normal population is actually two distinct processes occurring simultaneously, and that the 
uncoupling which happens in the case of blindsight is what allowed us to realize the difference 
between the capacity for awareness and ability for discrimination. This suggested that blindsight 
patients’ ability to discriminate is not unconscious, like Block claimed, but rather is “conscious, 
yet severely degraded vision”150. By extending the same logic to the normal population, we can 
claim that discrimination itself, which correlates to activation of particular visual areas in the brain, 
is a form of degraded conscious vision.  
Accordingly, if, in the case of the vertical line, the capacity of the blindsight patient to 
discriminate whether the line is horizontal or vertical correlates to specific activation of certain 
areas associated with detecting spatial orientation, then we can push for the claim that as long as 
the visual information can reach the appropriate specialized module, then information regarding 
the orientation should be available regardless of whether or not that information registers as 
phenomenal character. Interestingly, research has shown that “human visual sensitivity and acuity 
is typically better at horizontal and vertical orientations than at oblique orientations”151. Furmanski 
and Engel demonstrated that orientation-specific signals arise early in visual processing, where an 
asymmetry has been observed in “the responses of human primary visual cortex (V1) to oriented 
stimuli”152; specifically, that “V1 produces a larger response to cardinal stimuli than to oblique 
stimuli”153. These results proposed the possibility that “distinct populations of neurons within a 
 
the V1 lesion, “perhaps by increasing the overall level of background neural noise in [the patient’s] spared pathways”, 
although they affirm that there’s no direct evidence of this. – Zeki and ffytche, "The Riddoch Syndrome,” 40-41.  
150 Morten Overgaard, Katrin Fehl, Kim Mouridsen, Bo Bergholt, and Axel Cleeremans. "Seeing Without Seeing? 
Degraded Conscious Vision in a Blindsight Patient." PloS one 3, no. 8 (2008): 1. 
151 Bruce C. Hansen and Edward A. Essock. "A Horizontal Bias in Human Visual Processing of Orientation and Its 
Correspondence to The Structural Components of Natural Scenes." Journal of vision 4, no. 12 (2004): 1045. 
152 Christopher S. Furmanski and Stephen A. Engel. "An Oblique Effect in Human Primary Visual Cortex." Nature 
neuroscience 3, no. 6 (2000): 535. 
153 Furmanski and Engel, “An Oblique Effect,” 536. 
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cortical area can be isolated and functionally linked to perception”154,155. If we suppose that the 
lesions in V1 in the case of the blindsight patient do not affect the particular groups of neurons that 
are sensitive towards cardinal rather than oblique orientation, and if these groups of neurons share 
a capacity for discrimination similar to that in the case of V5 and motion, then that already gives 
us a neural basis for how the specialized modules of blindsight patients are capable of 
consciously 156  discriminating between horizontal and vertical lines without the need for 
hierarchical processing, since the question they’re asked is specifically about a single feature 
which has been processed accurately.  
We felt it important to reiterate here that this thesis is in no way endorsing this model as 
something which can be generalized. All we are attempting to present is a case where a 
phenomenal concept features in rational thinking without the accompanying phenomenal character 
as a way of arguing that it does exist as its own class of concepts. What is left now is to answer 
how exactly can the executive system guess certain aspects of a stimulus that has been processed 
 
154 Furmanski and Engel, “An Oblique Effect,” 536. 
155 Notice how this oblique effect is different from the horizontal effect. The first indicates that “sensitivity for simple 
stimuli is widely reported to be superior at horizontal and vertical orientations and worst at oblique orientations”, 
while the latter indicates that “visual sensitivity is best at oblique orientations, worst at horizontal, and intermediate at 
vertical” in the case of broad-band naturalistic stimuli. – Hansen and Essock, “A Horizontal Bias,” 1045. Meaning 
that, within a natural setting, the visual system shifts the priority from detecting cardinal stimuli to oblique ones. This 
is believed to have evolutionary advantages since “the content contained in typical [natural] scenes was found to 
exhibit a horizontal bias”, and thus “a mechanism that turns down sensitivity for the expected content in a typical 
scene would serve to relatively enhance the salience of unexpected or novel content at off-horizontal orientations”. – 
Hansen and Essock, “A Horizontal Bias,” 1055. 
156 Just to recap, Block argues: “I don’t mean to say that the blindsight patient is irrational.) The idea is that when a 
representation is not conscious—as in the blindsight patient’s blindfield perceptual representations—it can influence 
behavior behind the scenes, but only when the representation is conscious does it play a rational role; and so 
consciousness must be involved in promoting this rational role.” – Block, “On a Confusion,” 160. Our argument shows 
that when guessing the right orientation and reporting on it, the blindsight patient is not engaged in any unconscious 
operation, but rather a conscious rational determination. The reason Block makes this argument is that he sees no way 
for information to travel from the specialized modules directly to the executive system. We took issue with how he 
explains reporting, which is a clear sign of A-consciousness, in terms of a specialized module taking over direct control 
– as if this reporting could fall under the control of the Autonomic nervous system. Our argument presented a possible 
way for the executive system to trace the set of possible information from a given neural trace and make an educated 
guess about certain features of a stimulus.   
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and discriminated by certain brain regions without the information passing through a phenomenal 
consciousness? 
o Premise 3: The Nature of Representation (Neural Tracing)  
If we look at the previous question with respect to the full argument we are developing, we 
can say that since what is in play in the case of a blindsight patient is a form of a “severely degraded 
vision”, than what is being produced is also a form of a severely degraded representation. If we 
take a representation to involve a perceptual experience, a correlated phenomenal experience, and 
an instantiated phenomenal concept, and if we consider the capacity of the blindsight patient to 
guess that the line is vertical as a successful diminished representation, then we need to ask how it 
is possible for a representation to only involve a phenomenal concept, without phenomenal 
content.157  
In his discussion of the relationship between memory and representation, Norman Malcolm 
argues against the idea that, what is involved in recalling a memory is “an image, copy, picture, 
pattern or representation”158. Instead, he argued for what he described as neural trace, stating that: 
You have an experience. The experience itself cannot survive the passage of time; but the 
structure of the experience can be stored in the brain. The neural mechanism that performs 
this function is the trace. As long as the trace persists you have a "dispositional" memory 
of the experience. The experience is "coded" into the trace. If one knew the code […] one 
could "read off" an experience from its trace. When the trace is subjected to the right sort 
of stimulus an "occurrent" memory results, which contains an active representation of the 
original experience.159  
 
 
157 It is important to note that the literature on blindsight patients refers to two types of patients: Type I have 
“discrimination capability in the total absence of any acknowledged awareness”, while Type II “have some ‘feeling’ 
of the occurrence of an event without seeing per se”. What we are presupposing in this argument is a type I blindsight 
patient. – Arash Sahraie, Paul B. Hibbard, Ceri T. Trevethan, Kay L. Ritchie, and Lawrence Weiskrantz. 
"Consciousness of The First Order in Blindsight." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107, no. 49 
(2010): 21217. 
158 Norman Malcolm. "Memory and representation." Nous (1970): 69. 
159 Norman Malcolm. "Memory and representation." Nous (1970): 69. 
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What this means is that as long as there is a capacity for this neural trace, the information should 
be relayed to whichever part of the brain traced this information. Consider the following story in 
the case of a blindsight patient: The executive system has seen many cardinal shapes in its day. It 
has marked the neural path the signal takes in travelling from the specialized module to 
phenomenal binding160. Once that path is triggered again, the executive system can make a guess 
as to which of the two most likely answers is the correct one. Whether this happens based on a 
specific sequence of firing or the involvement of a specific set of neurons is ambiguous at this 
point. What is unambiguous is that so long as the neural path is activated, a diminished 
representation can be traced by the executive system A-consciously. 
Much like in the case of uncoupling discrimination from awareness, where the information 
necessary for discriminating a stimulus does not require the subject to be aware of it, a case of 
uncoupling the relationship between A-consciousness and P-consciousness can be argued, where 
the information needed to report on a stimulus can be traced by A-consciousness without the 
verification of phenomenal character. 
What adds support to this understanding is that, given Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of 
primary metaphor, which argues that the neural substrata of sensorimotor domains allow for the 
conventional mental imagery “to be used for domains of subjective experience”, then one can 
argue that as long as these neural substrata are activated, the executive system should notice this 
activation. It would certainly be an odd experience for the executive system, and the subject as 
well, to have information which they are unable to connect with specific phenomenal character, 
but we can conceive of the phenomenal character which accompanies a situation like this to be 
one of puzzlement. The case, then, for the blindsight patient, and what sets them apart from normal 
 
160 We use phenomenal binding to signal to the moment of conversion from information to phenomenal experience.  
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population, is that the neural trace in their perception involves triggering mechanisms that are only 
specifically designed to think about the associated concepts, i.e. the executive system, and not 
those which are equipped with triggering the accompanying phenomenal character, i.e. 
phenomenal binding. In other words, it is a case of conscious uncoupling.  
 To demonstrate this idea of representations as neural tracing, consider for instance the 
patients with damage to their hippocampi. One of the more famous patients, referred to in the 
literature as KC, and earlier as NN, provided the following introspection to Endel Tulving in 1985 
who was following up with him at the time. KC states that asking him to envision his future is 
“like being in a room with nothing there and having a guy tell you to go find a chair, and there’s 
nothing there”, and in another occasion, as “swimming in the middle of a lake. There’s nothing 
there to hold you up or do anything with” 161. Tulving hypothesized that “recollection and episodic 
future thought are two sides of the same core cognitive capacity, which he termed ‘autonoetic (self-
knowing) consciousness’”162. This means that, despite understanding the concept of future, the 
patient was unable to fulfill the content which falls under that concept in their everyday life; as if 
the concepts turned into an empty set. As if, to be more imaginative, the lever inside the executive 
system which is responsible for triggering the neural trace that allowed for the realization of the 
concept “future” and its application to a set of data still exist, albeit without the wiring which 
allows for such neural tracing to take place, which in turn did not allow for a representation to be 
possible.  
§ Conclusion: 
Based on our premises, we can argue that  
 
161 Kathleen B. McDermott, Karl K. Szpunar, and Kathleen M. Arnold. "Similarities in Episodic Future Thought and 
Remembering: The Importance of Contextual Setting." Predictions in the brain: Using our past to prepare for the 
future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 84. 
162 McDermott, et. al., "Similarities in Episodic Future,” 84. 
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P1. If symbolic concepts are built up on sensorimotor and perceptual systems, meaning 
they’re the product of a process of symbolic encoding from their original form as phenomenal 
concepts 
P2. If specific areas in the brain are capable of discriminating stimuli without necessarily 
being aware of them, meaning that the processing of a stimuli is enough to trigger the concept 
associated with it without necessarily having a phenomenal content attached to it 
P3. If representations are processes of neural tracing,  
C. then the blindsight patient’s executive system does have a representation of the 
phenomenal concept, albeit diminished and uncorroborated by phenomenal character, which is 
produced by processing the stimulus in the specialized module; a representation which is possible 
through tracing which neural path is active during the perceptually-positive/phenomenally-
negative experience of the stimulus. This means that what the executive system really lacks in the 
case of blindsight is phenomenal content as a verification tool163 – which pushes the executive 
system to guess by eliminating one of the two possibilities it is presented with, based on previous 
experience. The question to be tackled now concerns the extent of control phenomenal concepts 
can have over behavior, precisely in cases of diminished A-consciousness.  
 
Section III: The Behavioral Question  
- The purpose of this section is to argue that phenomenal concepts can affect behavior in 
the case of an absent/diminished A-consciousness. 
 
163 This idea of phenomenal content as a verification tool can be used to argue for why hallucination do not seem to 
be real despite their engagement with the same neural paths used during perception. Perhaps all there is for a someone 
realizing he is hallucinating a dagger floating in the air is that the phenomenal character of the experience seems odd 
when coupled with the phenomenal concept.  
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In a 1995 experiment, a group of researchers lead by Sarah Boysen, offered chimps two trays of 
candy; one with a lesser number of candy than the other. In order to choose, the chimp has to 
point at one of the trays. The catch, however, is that the chimp then gets the other tray and not 
the one it chose. In Boysen’s lab, chimps “seem unable to learn to make the optimal choice here, 
despite hundreds of trials”164; they tended to choose the tray with the more candy. Godfrey-
Smith refers to this as the “candy-versus-candy (“c/c”) condition”165. 
Having learned Arabic numerals in other experiments, the chimps were then presented 
with the problem again – this time with numerals instead of candy. The chimps tended to 
perform well in this task almost immediately. One explanation for that, as Godfrey-Smith 
elaborated following Boysen, is that a “basic or primitive perception–action mechanism is 
interfering with information processing. The use of symbols frees the chimp from the constraints 
of this primitive mechanism, and the chimp can then exercise the right choice.”166. 
In the first follow up, instead of the candy/candy condition, the group introduced a 
rock/rock condition to test whether “the intrinsic desirability of the candies that is causing the 
trouble, or are there deeper differences between thinking in terms of concrete objects and thinking 
in terms of symbols?”167. The chimps “did almost as badly with the rock/rock condition as they 
did with the c/c one”168 which ruled out this possibility. In the second follow up, the group used 
mixed pairs of trays, candy/numeral, and found that the chimps treated the this more like 
numeral/numeral and not like candy/candy. Godfrey-Smith notes that “[t]he presence of one 
numeral was enough to get them on track to make the right choice”169. The results suggest that the 
 
164  Peter Godfrey-Smith. "Untangling The Evolution of Mental Representation." In Evolution, Rationality and 
Cognition, ed. António Zilhão (Routledge, 2006.), 4. 
165 Godfrey-Smith, “Untangling,” 94.  
166 Godfrey-Smith, “Untangling,” 94. 
167 Godfrey-Smith, “Untangling,” 95. 
168 Godfrey-Smith, “Untangling,” 95. 
169 Godfrey-Smith, “Untangling,” 95. 
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chimps are engaged in “a different kind of processing” in dealing with numerals than when they 
are dealing with objects, as the symbolic representation of the problem “makes possible more 
flexible, information-driven, and decision-theoretically rational behavior”170.  
 A similar situation of this sort of automatic behavior can be seen in epileptics with seizure 
during performing mundane tasks. It is observed that they “continue their activities in a routinized, 
mechanical way despite, [as John Searle argues], a total lack of consciousness”171. Block goes into 
a lengthy discussion disputing the claim that there is a lack of consciousness per se172. What he 
argues is that what is lacking in the epileptics is A-consciousness and not P-consciousness. He 
asks, in the case of a walking epileptic,  
Doesn’t he see the obstacles he avoids? Suppose he gets home by turning right at a red wall. 
Isn’t there something it is like for him to see the red wall—and isn’t it different from what 
it is like for him to see a green wall? Searle gives no reason to think the answer is no. 
Because of the very inflexibility and lack of creativity of the behavior they exhibit, it is the 
thought processes of these patients (including A-consciousness) that are most obviously 
deficient; no reason at all is given to think that their P-conscious states lack vivacity or 
intensity.173 
 
Block then likens the case of a walking epileptic to that of a distracted driver. He argues that in 
both cases, there is no reason to claim that P-consciousness is absent, but there is some reason to 
think that “perhaps his A-consciousness of what he sees is diminished. (Of course, it can’t be 
totally gone or the car would crash.)”174. This idea of a diminished A-consciousness can be 
understood in terms of habits. Anyone who took on a semi-mechanical job can relate to how, in 
certain times when one is busy thinking of something else, the person might lack distinct memory 
of the tasks performed, yet evidence would suggest they have been performed well enough.  
 
170 Godfrey-Smith, “Untangling,” 95. 
171 Block, “On a Confusion,” 160. 
172 Block, “On a Confusion”, pp. 187-195 
173 Block, “On a Confusion,” 188. 
174 Block, “On a Confusion,” 191. 
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 What is common between the three cases of the chimps, the walking epileptic and the 
distracted driver is that they lack creativity and voluntary decision making (ignoring the cognitive 
differences between the subjects in three cases, of course). What they tell us is an ability from the 
side of P-consciousness to step up and take over behavior, either radically in the case of the chimps, 
or in a manner in line with delegations in the cases of the walking epileptic and the distracted 
driver. The question here is, can P-consciousness take control over rational behavior even in cases 
where A-consciousness is not diminished? We can already observe this happening on two 
occasions: reflexes and diverting attention. If a person sees a ball hurling towards him, the person 
will move his hand to fend his face without freely deciding to do so. There is no “conscious 
decision” to lift his arm to fend off the ball. In the case of attention, consider how it can be directed 
both intentionally and unintentionally: 
Top-down influences are based on the observer’s “internal” experience, much concerned 
with one’s intention, constituted by past experiences and expectations over that context and 
scenario. Bottom-up influences, on the other hand, are based on facts that are external to 
the observer, mainly built from stimulus salience which, by its turn, represents the degree 
of attracting one’s attention based on basic features from the visual map. In another way 
to put it, top-down (endogenous attentional control) is what you expect and bottom-up 
(exogenous attentional control) is the summation of basic physical characteristics of items 
in a visual display. Consequently, visual attention can be voluntarily directed to goal-
driven purposes, such as looking for something you lost at a public place, however 
remaining open to random salient stimuli, like a flash of light.175 
This opens up an interesting feature of specialized modules processing of features of stimuli, which 
is the urgency value a specialized module would assign to information about a stimulus, and how 
the “summation of basic physical characteristics of items in a visual display”, or phenomenal 
binding as we would call it, takes into consideration these assigned values when making the 
decision to either maintain the decision of the executive system to continue focusing on goal-
 
175 Eduardo Sturzeneker Trés and Sonia Maria Dozzi Brucki. "Visuospatial Processing: A Review from Basic to 
Current Concepts." Dementia & neuropsychologia 8, no. 2 (2014): 179. 
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driven purposes, or to override the decision of the executive system and divert attention towards a 
specific stimulus which was deemed urgent by the specialized module.176 
 If we take this understanding and apply it to such a highly contested case as the distracted 
driver, we find that the debate has been centered around the wrong questions. While Michael Tye 
argues for the possibility of a distracted driver since he accepts first-order representation, and 
Wayne Wright argues against that possibility through what he calls “higher-order attention theory”, 
both philosophers fail to tell is anything about the urgency value of the stimuli surrounding the 
distracted driver. Compare a driver who has been driving one the same dusty slim empty road 
between his house and his work for the past 10 years to another driver who has only been driving 
for 10 days and is getting on the freeway. Naturally, the first driver can afford to be distracted 
since his diminished sense of A-consciousness about his surroundings, his habitual behavior, can 
take over and deliver him to his destination without much intervention from a more elaborate A-
consciousness given how no creativity is required to perform that task. On the contrary, the driver 
on the freeway cannot afford to get distracted or else he will most certainly crash. Both Tye and 
Wright are correct in regarding the distracted driver, but both are inadequately representing the 
whole spectrum of possibilities regarding which level of representation is required to perform the 
task under specific circumstances.  
 
 
 
176 To elaborate more on this idea of urgency value, consider the following example: you walk into your office and 
everything is where it is supposed to be. The urgency value assigned to your perceptual experience is zero. You feel 
whatever feelings normally associated with your office. The next day, you enter your office. Your wife has added a 
new lamp to your disk. You do not notice the lamp immediately since it is not lit, and it is set up in a non-invasive 
way. This is an urgency value of level 1. The next day, you enter your office. There are now 5 lit lamps on your disk. 
You notice the lamps immediately and you think to yourself what is going on here? You switch the lamps off and you 
go about your business. This is an urgency value of 2. The urgency value assigned by your specialized modules to the 
items of your environment depends on how odd the items seem to be according to your expectations of what occupies 
the environment. 
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Chapter III: Neurophilosophy and Epistemology Naturalized 
We have now argued our case that thought always involves phenomenal concepts. We reckon it is 
important here to note that what we have argued is not some form of behavioral determinism, 
whereby a certain phenomenal concept entails a necessary behavioral outcome—far from it. What 
we argued is simply that upon coming in contact with a stimulus, the content of a phenomenal 
concept necessarily becomes available for the free use of reasoning for the experiencing subject. 
The necessity condition we are arguing is between stimulus s and phenomenal concept c, and not 
between phenomenal concept c and behavior b. What the subject does with c is a matter of 
reasoning, except perhaps in cases of reflexes. What’s next is to survey the philosophical 
theoretical space in order to ground our thesis within established doctrines. We will begin by 
discussing the concept and methodology of neurophilosophy, followed by a survey of theories of 
consciousness, then a survey of theories of perception, and ending with a discussion of the concept 
of epistemology naturalized. What our thesis aligns itself with is Block’s Biological theory of 
consciousness, Phenomenalism, and two-factor semantics. Our liberal use of the word “survey” is 
prompted by our method of highlighting the relevant parts of a favorable theoretical landmark by 
contrasting it with neighboring contesting ideas. We ask the reader to proceed with the 
understanding that the limited space we have does not allow to fully dive into each of the 
theoretical landmark, but only to present how our work relates to it.  
Prologue: Neurophislosophy 
Just as the name suggests, neurophilosophy is concerned with measuring up our philosophical 
theories of the mind to our understanding of the neurology of the brain. It presupposes a type of 
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mind-brain correlation177, i.e. “correlations between mental phenomena and neural states of the 
brain”178. A formulation of the mind-brain thesis can be seen as follows: 
For each type M of mental event that occurs to an organism o, there exists a brain state of 
kind B (M’s “neural correlate” or “substrate”) such that M occurs to o at time t if and only 
if B occurs to o at t.179,180 
 
However, the study of neurophilosophy is not only restricted to the neurology of the brain. In the 
introduction to her book “Neurophilosophy,” Patricia Churchland explains that  
The sustaining conviction of this book is that top-down strategies (as characteristic of 
philosophy, cognitive psychology, and artificial intelligence research) and bottom-up 
strategies (as characteristic of the neurosciences) for solving the mysteries of mind-brain 
function should not be pursued in icy isolation from one another. What is envisaged instead 
is a rich interanimation between the two, which can be expected to provoke a fruitful co-
evolution of theories, models, and methods, where each informs, corrects, and inspires the 
other.181 
 
Thus, we can say that our methodology in this thesis has been in line with Patricia Churchland’s 
understanding of how an investigation into neurophilosophy should be carried on: we have used 
experiments from behavioral psychology in conjunction with our neural understanding of the 
nature of hallucinations to argue for the outwardly nature of consciousness182. We have also 
 
177 Regarding the mind-brain identity thesis, we need to make our position clear: Phenomenal mental events (P-type) 
are different from Access mental events (A-type). And so, for all mental events of the P-type, the occurrence of mental 
event p of the P-type necessarily means being in biological B-type b because p = b, since all P-types = some B-type. 
The same does not apply for Access mental events since we do not know how specific cognitive types correlate to 
physical states. In other words, we endorse a stronger identity thesis for P-type events and a weaker correlation thesis 
for A-type events. We believe that lumping together all mental events as one type, as often done in the literature, 
misses the point of the distinction between A/P consciousness. Note that this applies only to biological beings. Any 
argument regarding artificial intelligence falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
178 Jaegwon Kim, "Mind as the Brain: The Psychoneural Identity Theory” in Philosophy of mind (Routledge, 2018), 
91.  
179 Kim, “Mind as the Brain,” 92.  
180 It is important to note that this does not necessarily entail a one to one correlation. Kim maintains that “[i]t is 
plausible that everything that occurs in mental life has a state of the brain (or the central nervous system) as its 
proximate physical basis.” – Kim, Mind, 93. The emphasis on proximate is Kim’s. 
181 Patricia Smith Churchland. “General Introduction,” in Neurophilosophy: Toward a unified science of the mind-
brain. (MIT press, 1989), 3. 
182 Just to remind the reader, in the introduction we stated that “we rather argue that since the nature of consciousness 
itself is outwardly, which means that it is constantly seeking stimuli, then thinking is also outwardly in nature. That is 
to say, not only do stimuli necessarily feature into our thinking, but they make it possible in the first place.” Basically, 
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considered the neural basis of perception in conjunction with cognitive theories of concept 
formation to come to an understanding of the nature of phenomenal concepts.  
Neurophilosophy also presupposes, on the conception of Churchland, a type of naturalized 
epistemology whereby they both reject the idea of a first philosophy in favor of an understanding 
of science that needs no Archimedean point of view from which it can be assessed.183 It embraces 
the formal circularity that this entails and moves on with its projects. Later on, we will discuss the 
concept of naturalized epistemology in some detail. At the moment, we need to answer the 
question: following our long discussion of the outwardly nature of consciousness and phenomenal 
concepts, which established theory of consciousnesses would our thesis support?  
 
Section I: The Biological Side of Things 
Our understanding of the theoretical framework of studying consciousness falls within the realm 
of the Biological Theory of Consciousness. According to it, “consciousness is some sort of 
biological state of the brain” 184  whereby, for instance, the visual experience of motion is 
identifiable in terms of a brain state of the activation of area MT+ in the visual cortex.185 We have 
explained how we see the activation of a certain specialized module as the cause for both a 
phenomenal concept and its phenomenal content. The theory contends that “the specific geometry 
of the connectivity matters; […] the location of specific neuromodulators and their effects matter; 
 
what this means is that a subject can’t have cognitive higher-brain states without lower-brain functions in operation, 
even if the higher-brain state is not about the lower-brain function.  
183 Patricia Smith Churchland. “Introduction and Historical Sketch,” in Neurophilosophy: Toward a unified science of 
the mind-brain. (MIT press, 1989), 265. 
184  Ned Block, "Comparing the major theories of consciousness". In The Cognitive Neurosciences IV, 
ed. M. Gazzaniga, (MIT Press, 2009), 1112 
185 Block, “Comparing,” 1112. 
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[…] the architecture matters; […] the fine temporal rhythms of the spiking patterns matter”186,187. 
It also presupposes that “transfer of coding of information from electrical to chemical and back to 
electrical is necessary to consciousness”188. Thus, our understanding of the biology and neurology 
of the brain contributes to our understanding of the nature of consciousness.  
 Naturally, the Biological theory does not operate in a vacuum. In a paper titled “Comparing 
the Major Theories of Consciousness,” Ned Block compares it with two other major theories: 
Higher-Order-Thought (or HOT) theory and Global Workspace theory189. HOT argues that “a 
[phenomenally]conscious experience of red consists in a representation of red in the visual system 
accompanied by a thought in the same subject to the effect that the subject is having the experience 
of red”190. Global Workspace is a form of functionalism, whereby the perceptual systems produce 
representations which are consumed by reporting mechanisms, which in turn supply 
representations that are further consumed by the same set of mechanisms.191 Block’s discussion is 
rich and long, and we lack the space to go through it in detail. Rather, what we wish to do is to 
highlight the points of contestation that our thesis has with HOT and Global Workspace. 
 Although the Global Workspace theory “is motivated and described in neural terms”192, 
it’s fundamental claim can be easily applied to silicon-based computers just as it can be applied to 
biological entities like us193. It views consciousness as “an abstract structure that does not include 
 
186 Daniel Dennett. "Are we explaining consciousness yet?." Cognition 79, no. 1-2 (2001): 234. 
187 This is not to say that Dennett endorses the biological theory. Block cited Dennett’s words in his article to criticize 
Dennett for not acknowledging the obvious. The point is that if Dennett accepts the truth of this statement yet denies 
the biological theory of consciousness, then that is a contradiction.  
188 Block, “Comparing,” 1119. 
189 The rationale Block gives for only choosing these three opponent theories is that they are “theories of consciousness 
that are taken most seriously by neuroscientists” Block, “Comparing,” 1111. We agree with the criteria that there 
needs to be a level of convergence between philosophers and neuroscientists in order to consider a theoretical 
framework. 
190 Block, “Comparing,” 1111. 
191 Block, “Comparing,” 1111. 
192 Block, “Comparing,” 1111. 
193 Note that Global Workspace theorists do not make the same distinction between A/P consciousness as Block does. 
So, although this claim makes sense regarding A-conscious states, it doesn’t regarding P-conscious states.  
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the messy details of neuroscience”194. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 1, evidence from 
Zeki’s work puts pressure on forms of Global Workspace, which suggest an underlying temporary 
memory operating in the background, given how subjects systematically mis-bind information 
about stimuli in their phenomenal perception.  
Regarding HOT theorists195, the problem lies in its over commitment to the cognitive rather 
than the phenomenal aspect of our mental life. Both Biological and Global theorists see HOT as a 
hyper-intellectualist thesis, while HOT theorists hold that the Biological and Global Workspace 
theories “underestimate the role of cognition in consciousness”196. In our first chapter, we have 
already flipped the claim of HOT upside down. Rather than argue that an explicitly A-conscious 
cognitive thought is required to experience a P-conscious experience, we have established that 
phenomenal experience is a necessary component to have any thought at all, in biological beings. 
For in cases of sensory restriction where subjects’ perceptual systems are deprived of stimulation, 
the subject’s executive system begins to solicit stimulation, either by magnifying the already 
minimal stimulation available or by creating hallucinatory perceptual content of which it can have 
a phenomenal experience. Moreover, Block argues that given how “newborns who are circumcised 
without anesthesia or analgesia are more stressed by later vaccination even 6 months later”197, and 
that the “frontal cortex, the likely neural home of thought about thought […] is immature in 
infancy”198, then that puts pressure on arguing for the need for an explicit A-conscious thought in 
order to be able to experience a phenomenal experience.  
 
194 Block, “Comparing,” 1111. 
195 Block is conscious to only critique the more “ambitious” version of the thesis, not other less ambitious versions 
which allow for the biology to dictate certain aspects of our cognitive life but inly stress the importance of the cognitive 
over the phenomenal.  
196 Block, “Comparing,” 1113. 
197 Block, “Comparing,” 1117. 
198 Block, “Comparing,” 1117. 
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 Now that we have given a brief account of why we believe the Biological theory has more 
appeal than other theories, we need to take a look at which established theory of perception does 
our thesis champion.  
 
Section II: First-Order Representationalism, Phenomenalism, and NEF 
Within the biological theory of consciousness, two major theories lay claim to the way the 
operation of perception occurs: first-order representationalism (or FOR) which argues that “any 
conscious state is a representation, and what it’s like to be in a conscious state is wholly determined 
by the content of that representation”199, and phenomenalism which argues that “the phenomenal 
character of experience is [not] exhausted by such representational content”200. Formulated like 
this, they look like two completely incompatible theses. However, three observations would 
suggest a deeper affinity between the two theses: 
1- Phenomenalism is expansive enough to accommodate representationalist claims. For 
instance, representationalism insists on the “narrow intentional content” 201  in the 
phenomenal character of an experience. Phenomenalism does not object to cases of 
experiences having a narrow intentional content. This much both theories are in agreement 
about. What phenomenalism adds is that the intentional content is not exhaustive of the 
phenomenal character of the experience. On this view of FOR, the disagreement is on 
whether or not the phenomenal character is solely determined by the content of the 
 
199 Neil Mehta and George A. Mashour, “General and Specific Consciousness: A First-Order Representationalist 
Approach”, Frontiers in Psychology 4 (2013): 1. 
200 Ned Block. “Mental Paint,” in Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2007): 533. 
201 Block, “Mental Paint,” 534. 
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representation. Thus, there’s no issue regarding the informational content of experience 
between the two theses.  
2- On Dretske’s view of FOR, he maintains that the representationalist thesis concedes that 
“[t]he qualitative character [qualia] of perceptual experience […] is not functionally 
definable. It is, however, physically definable”202. This view is in agreement with the 
phenomenalist thesis, given that both theses agree that a biological basis is part of the 
perceptual experience. Perhaps what Dretske would object to is the claim that the 
phenomenal content is accompanied by a phenomenal concept, i.e. as the product of lower-
brain functions, but this much is not clear from our reading.  
3- Misreading of the phenomenalist thesis lead to more confusion about what it actually 
claims. Mehta and Mashour claim that advocates of the biological theory of consciousness 
“identifies sensory (and perhaps also post-sensory) processing regions as the neural 
correlates of general consciousness”203,204. Problem is, when reading closely, one cannot 
find such identification. Block maintains that “[o]f course, an activated MT+ even with 
feedback to lower visual areas is not all by itself sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. 
No one thinks that a section of visual cortex in a bottle would be conscious”205. Furthermore, 
as we have stated in an earlier footnote in Chapter 1, Zeki maintains that it is true that “over 
longer periods of time, in excess of 500 ms, we do see different attributes in perfect 
temporal and spatial registration, which itself demands an explanation”206. This perfect 
temporal and spatial registration does not suggest that the mere processing of stimulation 
 
202 Fred Dretske. Naturalizing the mind. (MIT Press, 1997), 72. 
203 Mehta and Mashour, "General and specific consciousness”, 6. 
204 Mehta and Mashour’s specific and general consciousness are correlative to Zeki’s micro and macro consciousness.  
205 Block, “Comparison,” 1112. 
206 Zeki, “A Theory of Micro-consciousness,” 584 
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within a specialized module is sufficient for general (or macro-consciousness), it only 
suggests that more research is needed in order to answer how macro-consciousness is 
possible.  
Perhaps one issue that does put a divide between the two theses is the position each theory takes 
regarding the semantics of representation. Chris Eliasmith explains that there are 3 classes of 
perceptual semantic theories: causal (championed by Fred Dretske and Jerry Fodor), conceptual-
role (championed by Gilbert Harman and Brian Loar), and two-factor theories (championed by 
Ned Block and Harty Field)207 , 208. Within his discussion of Neural Engineering Framework 
(NEF)209, Eliasmith differentiates between encoding, that is “the process of responding to some 
physical environmental variable through the generation of neural action potentials, or ‘spike 
trains’”210, and decoding, which is the process by which a system decodes “the value of a variable 
as it is encoded into neural spikes train”211.  Between encoding and decoding, Eliasmith maintains 
that one of the key contributions of theoretical neuroscience has been “not to assume that the 
stimuli presented to an animal is automatically, or fully represented, despite observed 
correlations”212. This idea puts pressure on the view of the naïve causal theory, under which 
representationalism can be filed, which says that “a brain state represents whatever causes it to be 
active” 213 . Rather, this view of the transmission and transformation of information between 
 
207 Chris Eliasmith, "Neurocomputational models: Theory, application, philosophical consequences." In The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience, ed. John Bickle (Oxford, 2009), [31/40]. 
208 Causal Theories uphold that “mental representations are about, and thereby mean, what causes them”, conceptual-
role theory maintains that the meaning is determined by “the overall role in a conceptual scheme”, and two-factor 
theories “both causal relations and conceptual role are equally important”. Thus, the focus of the first two is “on the 
decoding of whatever information happens to be in some neural state”, while the focus on the latter is on both the 
encoding and decoding. – Eliasmith, “Neurocomputational models,” [31/40]. 
209 Eliasmith describes NEF as a theoritcial framework that “draws heavily on past work in theoretical neuroscience, 
integrating work on neural coding, population representation, and neural dynamics to enable the construction of large-
scale biologically plausible neural simulations”. – Eliasmith, Neurocomputational, models, [3/40]. 
210 Eliasmith, “Neurocomputational models,” [5/40]. 
211 Eliasmith, “Neurocomputational models,” [13/40]. 
212 Eliasmith, “Neurocomputational models,” [5/40]. 
213 Eliasmith, “Neurocomputational models,” [5/40]. 
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perceptual systems and post-sensory systems changes the nature of the transmitted information 
lends support to Block’s and Field’s two-factor semantic theory.214 But given, as we saw above, 
that Dretske concedes that the qualia of an experience is physically defined rather than functionally 
defined, which downplays the conceptual role of his semantics, it is not clear how much difference 
there is between his theory of representation and Block’s two-factor semantic theory. 
 
Section III: Epistemology Naturalized  
The natural companion to arguing for a biological theory of consciousness is a naturalized version 
of epistemology. Quine’s thesis comes to the fore as one of the most prominent attempts at giving 
an argument for naturalizing epistemology. It is, however, outside the scope of this thesis to give 
a comprehensive argument for it. What we can do is give a brief account of Quine’s thesis and run 
through the opinions of some of its critics to highlights its relevant contributions. 
Quine’s Thesis 
As mentioned earlier in our discussion of the term “neurophilosophy”, the central point of Quine’s 
thesis is to do away with any “Archimedean point outside all science from which we can pronounce 
upon the acceptability of scientific theories”215. He describes it as embracing the image of a 
“mariner who has to rebuild his boat while staying afloat in it”216. Quine “believes that science 
requires no justification beyond measuring up to observation and the hypothetico-deductive 
 
214 Eliasmith maintains that “[g]iven the NEF characterization of representational vehicles, a representation is only 
defined once both the encoding and decoding processes are identified. This means that, contrary to both causal and 
conceptual role theories of content, both how the information in neural spikes is used (decoding), as well as how it is 
related to previous goings-on (encoding) are relevant for determining content”. - Eliasmith, “Neurocomputational 
models,” [32/40]. 
215 Patricia Churchland. “Introduction and Historical Sketch,” 265. 
216 W.V. Quine. “Epistemology Naturalized,” In Ontological relativity and Other Essays. (Columbia University Press, 
1969), 84 
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method” 217  and called for “epistemology [to merge] with psychology, as well as with 
linguistics”218. Our project in this thesis, of arguing for the outwardly nature of consciousness and 
the existence of phenomenal concepts, can be identified in accordance with the Quinian project of 
determining the “limited alphabet of perceptual norms […] toward which we tend unconsciously 
to rectify all perceptions. These, if experimentally identified, could be taken as epistemological 
building blocks, the working elements of experience”219. 
However, this move towards naturalizing epistemology has been widely criticized by some 
as a move to reduce epistemology to psychology (see for instance Putnam 1982, Stroud 1984, 
Davidson 1991, and Almeder 2002), while others argued that his thesis is not that different from 
the program of traditional epistemologists (see Foley 1994 and Jonsen 2005). Nonetheless, a closer 
look at Quine’s own formulation of the issue tells a different story. He maintains:  
The old epistemology aspired to contain, in a sense, natural science; it would construct it 
somehow from sense data. Epistemology in its new setting, conversely, is contained in 
natural science, as a chapter of psychology. But the old containment remains valid too, in 
its way. We are studying how the human subject of our study posits bodies and projects his 
physics from his data, and we appreciate that our position in the world is just like his. Our 
very epistemological enterprise, therefore, and the psychology wherein it is a component 
chapter, and the whole of natural science wherein psychology is a component book – all 
this is our own construction or projection from stimulations like those we were meting out 
to our epistemological subject. There is thus reciprocal containment, though containment 
in different senses: epistemology in natural science and natural science in epistemology.220 
The language Quine uses here is in direct contradiction to the charge of reducing epistemology to 
psychology. However, as we will shortly showcase in the three instances of criticism we will 
explore, the issues critics take with Quine systematically miss the mark regarding the true nature 
of the Quinian project.  
 
217 Roger Gibson, "Stroud on Naturalized Epistemology." Metaphilosophy 20, no. 1 (1989): 10. 
218 Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” 89-90. 
219 Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” 90.  
220 Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” 83. Emphasis added. 
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1. Stroud, The Skeptic 
In a chapter titled “Naturalized Epistemology,” Stroud argues that Quine’s conception of 
epistemology suggests his underlying commitment to skepticism. Stroud maintained that “the 
specific task for Quine is to understand how our knowledge is possible by understanding how the 
‘meager input’ at our sensory surfaces gives rise to the ‘torrential output’ in the form of sentences 
we accept as true about the external physical world”221 . He maintains that “[t]he theory of 
knowledge for Quine as for the tradition has its origin in doubt and the threat of scepticism”, and 
proceeds to quote Quine who says, “Doubt prompts the theory of knowledge, yes; but knowledge, 
also, was what prompted the doubt. Scepticism is an offshoot of science”222.  
 Stroud, however, criticizes Quine’s declaration that “skeptical doubts are really scientific 
doubts”. He calls this an attempt at a reductio ad absurdum to the skeptic project of questioning 
our knowledge of the external world by assuming that the skeptic must presuppose science in order 
to question it. Quine’s solution was that this presupposition from the skeptic would allow the 
epistemologist to use the best available science to answer the skeptic, however, Stroud counters 
that “the fact that 'sceptical doubts are scientific doubts' does not put the epistemologist who raises 
such doubts in the stronger position of being free to use scientific knowledge of the world in his 
effort to answer those doubts and explain how knowledge is possible” 223 . In short, Stroud 
maintains that “the epistemologist cannot use the now discredited science in constructing his/her 
defense of science”224. 
 
221 Barry Stroud, “Naturalized Epistemology,” in The Significance of Philosophical Scepticm (Oxford University Press, 
1984), 234  
222 Stroud, “Naturalized Epistemology,” 225. 
223 Stroud, “Naturalized Epistemology,” 229.  
224 Gibson, "Stroud on Naturalized Epistemology,” 3.  
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 However, as Roger Gibson explains in his rebuttal of Stroud’s reading of Quine, for the 
skeptic to be able to “show that some scientific posits are epistemologically unwarranted, […] his 
epistemological deliverances presuppose his interim acceptance of other scientific posits, namely, 
those presupposed by his own theory of evidence”225. Here is exactly where we spot an instance 
of appealing to an Archimedean point to judge science through. Quine’s main point is that 
skepticism “does not occur in an ontological vacuum (i.e. transcendentally)” which would then 
allow the skeptic the space to judge science. In fact, Quine’s perceive position is that there is no 
possible world where skeptic doubts would presuppose nothing whatsoever. And since it has to 
presuppose some facts about the world, and since there exists a reciprocal containment between 
epistemology and natural science, then the skeptic cannot maintain an Archimedean point from 
which he can judge science.   
2. Davidson, The Externalist 
In his article “Epistemology externalized,” Davidson rejects Quine’s account on the bases of it 
being “essentially first person and Cartesian” 226 . He, however, agrees with naturalized 
epistemology insofar as it propagates “third person approach to epistemology”227. The line of 
argument Davidson takes against Quine is reminiscent of the Moorean commonsense approach to 
philosophical problems. He maintains that 
as long as we adhere to the basic intuition that in the simplest cases words and thoughts 
refer to what causes them, it is clear that it cannot happen that most of our plainest beliefs 
about what exists in the world are false. The reason is that we do not first form concepts 
and then discover what they apply to; rather, in the basic cases the application determines 
the content of the concept.228 
 
 
225 Gibson, "Stroud on Naturalized Epistemology,” 5. 
226 Donald Davidson, “Epistemology externalized,” Dialectica 45, no. 2‐3 (1991): 193 
227 Davidson, “Epistemology externalized,”193. 
228 Davidson, “Epistemology externalized,” 195. 
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As much as this point is true, Davidson seems to miss the crux of Quine’s thesis. There’s no doubt 
that our concepts are molded by the application – we argued as much in Chapter 2 – however, 
when it comes to scientific definitions, the appeal to conceptual conventionality is put under 
pressure. In his explication of the formulation of definitions of scientific terms, Richard Boyd 
explains, following Quine, that “[t]he correct definitions of a scientific term is an a posteriori 
theoretical matter, not a matter of linguistic convention or stipulation”229.  Moreover, as Patricia 
Churchland maintained, that problems of the failures of imaginability puts pressure on any a priori 
concepts we may have from conventional use.230 
Furthermore, on the charge of Cartesianism, we find again the answer to that from Quine 
himself who maintains that  
The old tendency to associate observation sentences with a subjective sensory subject 
matter is rather an irony when we reflect that observation sentences are also meant to be 
the intersubjective tribunal of scientific hypotheses.231  
 
Quine here makes the case that if we are to accuse observation sentences of appealing only to the 
subjective sensory matter while simultaneously using them as a way of communicating 
information between one another is an oxymoron. And since his theory, not only allows, but 
advocates and refines observation sentences, then they cannot be making exclusive references only 
to subjective sensory matters. In short, Quine and Davidson agree on the basics of third-person 
approach to epistemology, but disagree on the extent of which our concepts, which are molded by 
sense data, are a reliable source of explaining our knowledge of the world.  
 
229 Richard Boyd, “Confirmation, Semantics, and the Interpretation of Scientific Theories”, in The Philosophy of 
Science. ed. by Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J.D. Trout. (MIT Press, 1991), 15. 
230 Patricia Churchland criticizes such failure of imagination: “What used to pass for a priori arguments about the 
impossibility of science discovering this or that (such as the impossibility of discovering that space is non-Euclidean 
or that mental states are brain states) were sometimes merely arguments based on what could or could not be imagined 
by some individual philosopher. Since what can or cannot be imagined about the empirical world is not independent 
of what is already understood and believed about the empirical world, failures of imaginability were all too often owed 
to ignorance or to inflexible imaginations”. - Patricia Churchland, “General Introduction,” 3. 
231 Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” 87. 
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3. Putnam, The Pluralist 
In his article “Why Reason Can't Be Naturalized,” Putnam takes issues with naturalizing 
epistemology, accusing it of following a positivist agenda that seeks to undermine the wide variety 
of human knowledge in favor of a mechanical account of human reason. According to Steven 
Wagner and Richard Warner, Putnam champions cultural relativism and argues that Quine’s 
naturalized epistemology is an attack on normativity, and that 
Philosophers who lose sight of the immanence of reason, of the fact that reason is always 
relative to context and institution, become lost in characteristic philosophical fantasies. 
“The ideal language,” “inductive logic,” “the empiricist criterion of significance”— these 
are the fantasies of the positivist, who would replace the vast complexity of human reason 
with a kind of intellectual Walden II.232,233 
He further accuses Quine of occupying an outside point of view which he describes it as “meta-
metalinguistic” where “there is no unique "world", no unique "intended model". Only structure 
matters”234,235. He makes reference to Quine’s unfortunate formulation of his thesis when he asks 
the infamous question: “Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle 
for psychology?”236 . This, Putnam takes it, is a clear assault on normativity and calls it an 
“attempted mental suicide”237. 
 While others, such as Jonsen 2005, agree with him on the unfortunate formulation of 
Quine’s question, we take issue with singling out this one question as a declaration of the death of 
the normative. The question, presented at the middle of the essay, can just as easily be read as a 
rhetorical question; one which invites the reader to follow along the Quinian line of thought. The 
 
232 Hilary Putnam, "Why reason can't be naturalized,” Synthese (1982): 8 
233 Walden II is a utopian novel by B. F. Skinner. 
234 Putnam, “Why reason can't be naturalized,” 17 
235 Putnam is referring to Quine’s insistence that the only criterion for science is science itself. Quine wanted to say 
that only through the structure of science can we legitimize science. An independent model would be anything other 
than the system of science.  
236 Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” 75.  
237 Putnam, “Why reason can't be naturalized,” 20. 
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reason for our argument is that the question does not sit right with Quine’s later comments 
regarding the reciprocal containment between epistemology and natural science. In this mush 
Jonsen agrees with our reading: that Putnam misses the mark by neglecting Quine’s project of 
merging together epistemology and psychology rather than eliminating psychology. Jonsen 
understand that Quine does not seek to eliminate the normative,  
so far is he from proposing to abandon the normative that he is proposing instead to 
discover the norms that govern theorizing by discovering the norms that we conform to in 
our theorizing. […] What he is actually proposing is to enlist the aid of psychology in 
addressing the burden of epistemology: psychology will identify the norms we adhere to, 
and philosophy will tell us that, by virtue of their being the ones we adhere to, they are the 
ones we are to adhere to.238  
 
Nevertheless, one can see the validity of Putnam’s concerns within their own context. Wagner and 
Warner argue that Putnam’s concerns follow those of Nelson Goodman, who “defends the arts on 
the grounds that they make cognitive contributions fundamentally similar to those of science”239. 
If this is the case behind Putnam’s advocation for “a centerless pluralism that recognizes the human 
value of diverse inquiries” 240 , then Putnam’s issue should be directed towards the purely 
positivists/eliminativists. However, as it stands, Quine seems to be advocating for understanding 
the normative, rather than eliminating it. A project which Putnam should have no direct issues 
with.  
Notes on the Theory and its Critics 
The idea behind the Quinian project, as Richard Foley crudely and rightly puts it, is “to make sure 
that our philosophical theories are compatible with science”241. However, it does not follow from 
 
238 Bredo Johnsen, “How to Read" Epistemology Naturalized",” The Journal of Philosophy 102, no. 2 (2005): 88. 
239 Steven Wagner and Richard Warner, “Introduction,” in Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. (Notre Dame, University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 8. 
240 Wagner and Warner, “Introduction,” 7.  
241 Richard Foley, "Quine and naturalized epistemology." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19, no. 1 (1994): 243. 
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this that we restrict our epistemological endeavor to only what science has already deemed correct. 
The idea is that theories must not depend on our desire to “deduce science from sense data”242, 
meaning that we do not stop only at what we are capable of conceiving, but to be founded on the 
best available scientific knowledge, which could be empirically accurate despite our inability to 
conceive of it through sense data243. Remember that Quine “believes that science requires no 
justification beyond measuring up to observation and the hypothetico-deductive method”244. The 
word “hypothetico” allows for going beyond the present state of knowledge, while the word 
“deductive” insures it is still empirically grounded. As we have maintained in the introduction, 
even Descartes used the best available scientific knowledge in his endeavor. This tradition 
continued until Kant and beyond. Thus, the reader of the history of philosophy will find it is not 
the most radical of ideas245. 
One interesting distinction between Quine and his critics is that the critics seem to 
unanimously miss what Block called “a confusion about a function of consciousness”246, namely 
the distinction between A- and P-Consciousnesses. What they seem to implicitly adopt is what is 
described by Michael Tye as a transparency thesis247 ,248 whereby there’s little to no barriers 
between when a stimulus falls on perceptual system and the utterance of an observation 
 
242 Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” 84. 
243 A way to conceive of this is the pressure that Zeki’s theory of microconsciousness puts on theories of global 
workspace and HOT theories of consciousness.  
244 Gibson, "Stroud on Naturalized Epistemology,” 10. 
245 It should be noted that we are here alluding to the instrumentality of science, as the not so radical an idea, rather 
than any a priori conceptions of how it should be grounded. The clash between Descartes as a rationalist, and a 
representative of the traditional epistemologists, and Quine as an ontological relativist does not affect such 
instrumentality.  
246 Ned Block. “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” in Consciousness, Function, and Representation: 
Collected Papers (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007). 
247 Putnam speaks of our capacity to revise our understanding of the world by discursive means, Davidson speaks 
about the connection between linguistic concepts and objects in the world, and Stroud is busied with knowing the set 
of explicit beliefs a subject has. In the three cases, there’s no distinction made between the type of consciousness that 
is engaged directly with the world and that which is concerned with our conceptual understanding of it, as Block 
explained in his work. 
248 A full discussion and refutation of the thesis can be found in A. D. Smith’s “Translucent Experiences” (2008). 
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sentence.249 Quine himself seems at times guilty of that, especially when he speaks about the 
connection between stimulation and observation sentences. What prompts us to argue that Quine 
has a similar understanding of the distinction between the two types of consciousnesses is his 
distinction between doctrinal and conceptual studies, as explained by Johnsen 
In the terms of Quine's broad framework in "Epistemology Naturalized," subjects' 
constructions of their world-pictures and Carnap's efforts at rational reconstruction fall on 
opposite sides of his division of epistemology into doctrinal and conceptual studies. 
Subjects engaged in constructing pictures of the world are developing "doctrines" that are 
the objects of doctrinal studies, which concern, inter alia, the justifiability of those 
doctrines; Carnap's efforts at reconstruction are conceptual studies aimed at showing that 
the everyday concepts employed in formulating those doctrines are theoretically 
dispensable in favor of sense data, or observations, plus logic and set theory.250 
 
What this suggests is that Quine at least was aware of the distinction between the nature of the 
concepts which allow a subject to construct his picture of the world, the phenomenal type, and 
those used in order to reconstruct a normative view of these concepts, the linguistic type. In our 
reading of Quine, this mirrors our distinction between phenomenal concepts, generated by the 
contact between the subject and his world, and linguistic concepts, which carry the discursive mark.  
Concluding Remarks  
Quine maintained that “it is simply the stimulations of our sensory receptors that are best looked 
upon as the input to our cognitive mechanism”251. Years later, Block made the distinction between 
A-consciousness and P-consciousness. Then Zeki provided the neural bases which supports 
Block’s theoretical distinction. These have been the guiding principles of this thesis. We attempted 
to look at the first part in the process of coming in contact with a stimulation. We began by flipping 
the position of HOT upside down by arguing that thought requires phenomenal character because 
 
249 In this treatise we showed, philosophically through Block and empirically through Zeki, and further through NEF, 
that a transparency thesis does not fit with our understanding of our biology, [i.e. it’s false].  
250 Johnsen, “How to Read" Epistemology Naturalized",” 80.  
251 Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” 84.  
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of the outwardly nature of consciousness, then proceeded to argue that any phenomenal content 
would necessarily be accompanied with a phenomenal concept, and that phenomenal concepts are 
relevant, both conceptually and behaviorally. We then situated our thesis within the larger 
theoretical field of theories of consciousness, perception and epistemology, to give the reader a 
broader understanding of our project. Many questions still remain unanswered after the conclusion 
of this particular project, but we remain hopeful that the continuous study of the brain will bring 
to the fore answers to at least some of these questions. 
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